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WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS: RECONCILING THE PURPORTED CONFLICTS
BETWEEN STATE LAW, FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW, AND
EQUAL PROTECTION TO PREVENT THE CREATION OF A
DISPOSABLE WORKFORCE
ROBERT I. CORREALESt
"I came to America because I heard the streets were paved with
gold. When I got here, I found out three things: first, the streets were not
paved with gold; second, they weren't paved at all; and third, I was ex-
pected to pave them." -Old Italian saying'
INTRODUCTION
For more than a century, undocumented migration to the United
States has provided a steady stream of workers to industries in which the
jobs are not attractive to citizens or other legal residents because of un-
pleasant or dangerous working conditions and low wages. Undocu-
mented workers are concentrated in high-risk, low-pay occupations such
as construction, agriculture, landscaping, meatpacking, hotel service, and
restaurant work. Their willingness to work unpleasant jobs for low
wages, the perception that they possess a superior work ethic, and the
minimal possibility that employers will be prosecuted for employing
them, combine to make undocumented immigrants particularly attractive
to employers desperate to find workers. Unfortunately, in many jurisdic-
tions they are welcome only as long as they are physically able to work.
State workers' compensation systems have adjusted in part to the
presence of this often critical and virtually permanent group of uninvited
guests. Indeed, a large number of state courts and legislatures have
awarded workers' compensation benefits to that group.2 Of the states that
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1. GEORGE BROWN TINDALL & DAVID E. SHI, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 942
(1984).
2. See Champion Auto Body v. Indus. Claim Appeal Office, 950 P.2d 671, 673 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1997); Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396, 409 (Conn. 1998); Gene's Harvesting v. Rodriguez,
421 So. 2d 701, 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Dynasty Sample Co. v. Beltran, 479 S.E.2d 773, 775
(Ga. Ct. App. 1996); Artiga v. M.A. Patout & Son, 671 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Ruiz
v. Belk Masonry Co., 559 S.E.2d 249, 251 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Gayton v. Gage Carolina Metals
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have considered this problem, only Wyoming continues to deny com-
pletely workers' compensation benefits to undocumented workers.
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However, this virtual unanimity in the workers' compensation field does
not extend to vocational rehabilitation services. Those services are gen-
erally provided to workers who cannot return to their original job after a
severe injury but who can work in a limited capacity or in other occupa-
tions after retraining. While several influential states have decided in
favor of disabled undocumented workers,4 others continue to deny them
those benefits. 5 Those states completely disavow any obligation to pro-
vide vocational rehabilitation services to undocumented workers, even
where work-related accidents result in life-long disabilities.
Inc., 560 S.E.2d 870, 872 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Femandez-Lopez v. Jose Cervino, Inc., 671 A.2d
1051, 1056 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 672 A.2d
221, 224 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Lang v. Landeros, 918 P.2d 404, 406 (Okla. Ct. App.
1996); Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 749 A.2d 1036, 1041 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000); Villa v. E. Wire Prods. Co., 554 A.2d 644, 646 (R.I. 1989); Commercial Standard Fire &
Marine Co. v. Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). Many states include "aliens" in
the definition of "employees." See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 23-901(5)(b) (2003); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3351(a) (Deering 2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 440.02(15)(a) (2003); TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. §§
401.011(4), 406.092 (Vernon 2003); see also Fernandez-Lopez, 671 A.2d at 1053 (holding that an
illegal alien's inclusion is "self-evident" from the statutory definition of employee); Brambila v.
Chase-Walton Elastomers, Inc., Bd. No. 6734092, 1997 WL 487359, at *5 (Mass. Dept. Indus.
Accidents Aug. 22, 1997) (holding that illegal aliens are included under the definition "employee").
However, as the Virginia experience demonstrates, coverage of undocumented immigrants does not
necessarily follow. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. The term "aliens" is commonly
applied to authorized immigrants, who do not always enjoy the same rights as citizens. Thus, states
that include "aliens" in their workers' compensation statutes without differentiating between legal
and undocumented immigrants, may mean legal resident or may simply not have encountered situa-
tions involving undocumented workers.
3. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-102(a)(vii) (Michie 2002) ("'Employee' ... includes
legally employed minors and aliens authorized to work [in the Unites States] by the United States
department of justice immigration and naturalization service."); see also Felix v. State ex rel. Wyo.
Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 986 P.2d 161, 164 (Wyo. 1999) (holding expressly that the defini-
tion of "employee" in §27-14-102(a)(vii) does not include illegal aliens). Though the subject is
beyond the reach of this article, Wyoming is also behind the times in its refusal to cover illegally
employed minors under its workers' compensation laws. § 27-14-102(a)(vii). For the protection of
the children and for public policy reasons, that issue has been decided in favor of the minors in most
other jurisdictions. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAW § 66.02 (2003) (citing forty states whose workers' compensation statutes cover illegally em-
ployed minors). Larson's treatise on workers' compensation identifies Idaho as another jurisdiction
that prohibits coverage of undocumented workers under its workers' compensation statute. Id. §
66.03 (citing IDAHO CODE § 72-1366(19)(a) (Michie 2002)). However, a closer look at the statute
reveals that the benefit prohibited is unemployment compensation, not workers' compensation.
Unemployment compensation is generally dependent on the worker's availability to work. IDAHO
CODE § 72-1366(5) (Michie 2003). In 1976, Congress passed a law denying certification to any state
unemployment compensation program that awards those benefits to undocumented workers. 26
U.S.C. §§ 3304(a)(14)(A), (c) (2000).
4. See, e.g., Foodmaker, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 767, 775
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998); Ruiz, 559 S.E.2d at 251, 254; Gayton, 560 S.E.2d at 874; Garcia v. Dep't of
Labor & Indus., 939 P.2d 704, 704-06 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (noting implicitly that vocational
rehabilitation benefits are payable to illegal aliens, but suspending employee's benefits for other
reasons).
5. See, e.g., Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175, 183 (Nev. 2001) (holding that
undocumented workers may receive workers' compensation, but not vocational rehabilitation).
Virginia provides workers' compensation but denies vocational rehabilitation by statute. See infra
notes 11-12 and accompanying text. Louisiana provides workers' compensation but denies voca-
tional rehabilitation by administrative regulation. See infra note 13.
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In many jurisdictions, undocumented workers who can work with-
out restrictions after medical treatment are simply returned to their jobs,
where they have become virtually indispensable. However, those who
without vocational rehabilitation are unable to return to work due to
permanent disabilities are systematically discarded without recourse.
This shortsighted practice contradicts traditional American notions of
justice and ignores important economic and social factors by creating
disposable workers who can be discarded after their useful lives have
accidentally expired. These workers are of the most vulnerable popula-
tions in the United States because they have the least political and eco-
nomic power of any group and enjoy virtually no safety nets.
This shadow population is primarily employed in high-risk occupa-
tions. Therefore, the economic windfall to private providers of workers'
compensation insurance coverage and self-insurers is quite significant.
Laws in some states enable those providers, or self-insurers, to save up to
$16,000 for every claim denied.6 In stark contrast, the real human conse-
quences of those policies can be devastating, not only to the undocu-
mented immigrants themselves, but to legal residents and citizens as
well.
Martha Gomez's case is typical. 7 Mrs. Gomez, a pregnant 28 year-
old, was brutally attacked by a stranger in a laundry room where she was
working as a maid for a Las Vegas hotel. As the attacker hit and kicked
Mrs. Gomez's abdomen, head, and back, she kept herself in a fetal posi-
tion to protect her pregnancy. Fortunately, Mrs. Gomez was able to save
her pregnancy and delivered her child (an American citizen) 8 on Febru-
ary 15, 1999. In March of 1999, after experiencing numbness and weak-
ness on the left side of her body, memory loss, and depression, Mrs.
Gomez was given a medical examination. The doctor concluded that
Mrs. Gomez had not received appropriate medical attention since her
attack. The doctor diagnosed limited range of motion in her spine and on
the left side of her body, and hemiparesis on the left side of her body.
The physician recommended extensive diagnostic work-ups including
MRI studies of the brain, cervical spine, and left shoulder, in addition to
a psychological evaluation. Ms. Gomez was declared totally and tempo-
rarily disabled pending results of the diagnostic work-ups. The doctor
also recommended vocational rehabilitation, but Mrs. Gomez was denied
that treatment because of her undocumented status.
6. The cost of vocational rehabilitation can be significant. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§
23.30.041(k)-(I) (Michie 2003) (authorizing vocational rehabilitation costs up to $13,300 for two
years); NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.580(2)(b) (2003) (authorizing lump sum of up to $20,000 in lieu of
vocational rehabilitation services available to injured employees who reside outside the state).
7. The three stories in this section are actual cases that took place in Nevada. The names of
the claimants have been changed. Records from their cases are on file with the author.
8. All children born in the U.S. are citizens of the country at birth. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471
U.S. 444,446 (1985).
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Another example is the case of Antonio Gutierrez, who suffered the
amputation of his left arm at the shoulder in a work-related accident. Mr.
Gutierrez's arm was severed at the shoulder by the blades of a cement
mixer. As a result of the accident, Mr. Gutierrez was determined to have
a permanent disability rating of fifty nine percent. Mr. Gutierrez was
restricted to light duty labor with a weight lifting limit of ten to twenty
pounds when he was released from care. Mr. Gutierrez was initially is-
sued a prosthesis with a hook. Later, he was given a "cosmetic" prosthe-
sis, but it was not functional with respect to employment. The employer
did not provide light duty employment within the restrictions established
by Mr. Gutierrez's physician, thus, pursuant to Nevada law, Employers'
Insurance Company of Nevada (EICN) (the state's provider of workers'
compensation insurance) became obligated to provide vocational reha-
bilitation services. However, on October 18, 1995, EICN determined that
because of Mr. Gutierrez's failure to supply "proof of his right to work,"
all vocational rehabilitation benefits would be suspended, and Permanent
Total Disability (PTD) would not be offered. The Appeals Officer agreed
with EICN's argument that the Immigration Reform Control Act of 1986
(IRCA) preempted state law and prohibited vocational rehabilitation ser-
vices or payments for permanent total disability. 9
In another case, Roberto Chavez sustained a severe back injury
when he fell fifteen feet to the ground from a scaffold while installing
sheetrock for a drywall company. After receiving treatment, Mr. Chavez
was released from medical care with physical restrictions of thirty
pounds maximum lifting and fifteen pounds repetitive lifting. Because
his former employer could not accommodate his restrictions, Mr. Chavez
became eligible for vocational rehabilitation services. In fact, Mr.
Chavez was initially offered vocational rehabilitation services, but on
September 2, 1997, EICN determined that Mr. Chavez was not eligible to
receive those services because of his inability to provide certification of
U.S. residency. That decision was upheld twice on appeal within the De-
partment of Administration of the State of Nevada. The District court
denied judicial review of the administrative decision.
These cases are typical in Nevada. However, disabled undocu-
mented workers have received similar treatment in other states, and
every jurisdiction is likely to eventually confront this issue. Virginia is
illustrative of jurisdictions that have experienced a recent influx of un-
documented immigrants. After many years of confusing and internally
inconsistent legal holdings denying coverage to undocumented work-
ers, 10 the Virginia general assembly recently amended the workers' com-
9. The District Court later reversed the appeals officer, finding that Mr. Gutierrez was enti-
tled to permanent total disability benefits.
10. Compare Manis Constr. Co. v. Arellano, 411 S.E.2d 233, 234 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (ratify-
ing the principle that an employer who knowingly hires an undocumented worker cannot then assert
the worker's immigration status as a defense to an "otherwise valid claim" under workers' compen-
[Vol. 81:2
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pensation statute to include "aliens" whether documented or not.1 How-
ever, the statute continues to deny undocumented workers access to the
state's vocational rehabilitation services, even in cases of severe and
lingering disabilities resulting from work-related accidents.12 Undocu-
mented workers face similar situations in Louisiana,13 Maryland,
4 and
the District of Columbia,15 three jurisdictions with growing numbers of
sation and "benefit from its own illegal act" (internal quotations omitted)), with Granados v. Wind-
son Dev. Corp., 509 S.E.2d 290, 292-93 (Va. 1999) (holding that a claimant's false representation of
his immigration status did not bar recovery under the state workers' compensation laws, but also
holding that a claimant who was an "illegal alien" was not an "employee" under the workers' com-
pensation laws, despite the fact that the Virginia statute defined employee as "[e]very person, includ-
ing a minor, in the service of another under any contract of hire," because IRCA renders their pur-
ported contracts of hire void and unenforceable (internal quotations omitted)), and Mendoza-Garcia
v. Cho Yeon Hwi/Best Cleaners, No. 1257-00-4, 2001 WL 292316, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 27,
2001) (denying a remedy under the state's workers' compensation statute to a worker knowingly
hired by an employer who had not purchased workers' compensation insurance, although Granados
had not foreclosed a remedy under those facts). In contrast, most other states that had considered the
issue did not find a conflict between IRCA and the states' workers' compensation laws. See, e.g.,
Dowling, 712 A.2d at 409-11 (reasoning that the question of whether the person's undocumented
status taints the employment relationship so as to render contracts for employment null and void
hinges on whether enforcement of the employment contract would contravene the public policy
underlying IRCA; finding that the primary purpose of IRCA is to "establish procedures that inhibit
the employment of undocumented workers and to punish employers who knowingly offer jobs to
those workers," the court reasoned that to "[permit] employers to avoid liability under the Workers'
Compensation Act, therefore, would ... provide unscrupulous employers with an incentive to em-
ploy undocumented workers" and thereby violate the Immigration Reform Act); see also supra note
2 (listing many jurisdictions that have considered the issue).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Michie 2003) (including "aliens . . . whether lawfully or
unlawfully employed" within its definition of "employee").
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-603(A)(3) (Michie 2003), states in relevant part: "The employer
shall also furnish or cause to be furnished . . . reasonable and necessary vocational rehabilitation
services; however, the employer shall not be required to furnish, or cause to be furnished, services
under this subdivision to any injured employee not eligible for lawful employment."
13. See Artiga, 671 So. 2d at 1139 (concluding that, "The Louisiana Workers' Compensation
Act ... does not exclude illegal aliens from securing workers' compensation benefits when justi-
fied"). However, the Louisiana Administrative Code denies vocational rehabilitation services to
undocumented immigrants. See LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 67, § 109(E)(1)(d) (2003) (stating that "Lou-
isiana Rehabilitation Services does not impose a residence requirement. Illegal aliens, however,
cannot be served").
14. In Maryland no statute prohibits vocational rehabilitation services to undocumented
workers. It appears that the state's workers' compensation agency simply assumes that such services
are not available to that group. See infra note 17.
15. An article in the Washington Post discussed the situation faced by undocumented workers
in the Virginia/ Maryland/D.C. area. The author tells the stories of Pedro Velazquez, an undocu-
mented construction worker who fell from a roof, suffering a broken leg, a smashed wrist, and a
fractured spine; Mario Perez, another undocumented worker whose right pinkie tendon was sliced by
a falling piece of plasterboard; and Luis Enrique Bonta, a Peruvian undocumented immigrant who
lost three fingers in a printing press accident. Though they could have benefited from vocational
rehabilitation, none of these workers were eligible to receive those services because of their un-
documented status. See Nurith C. Aizenman, Harsh Reward for Hard Labor; For Many Hispanic
Immigrants, Work Injuries End Dreams of a New Life, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2002, at C1. In con-
trast, legal residents throughout the U.S. are routinely retrained even where the resulting disabilities
are not as severe as those mentioned above. See City of Miami v. Mercer, 513 So. 2d 149, 150-51
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (approving a lump sum award to pay for aviation training); Towne v.
Bates File Co., 497 So. 2d 967, 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing denial of vocational reha-
bilitation request to allow worker with twenty-five percent impairment to temporarily relocate to Las
Vegas while enrolled in a casino gambling dealer's school); Johnson v. Shaw's Distribution Ctr.,
760 A.2d 1057, 1059-62 (Me. 2000) (upholding a rehabilitation award to help the claimant obtain a
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undocumented immigrants. Wyoming alone denies every kind of work-
ers' compensation service by statute.'6 The laws in many other states do
not seem to address whether undocumented workers are eligible for vo-
cational rehabilitation. Many jurisdictions have not yet had occasion to
consider the issue.
17
The denial of vocational rehabilitation to undocumented workers
raises two issues. The first involves the nature of available vocational
rehabilitation services, and whether they conflict with IRCA. The second
issue is whether state action denying those services is constitutional.
This Article argues that sound public policy supports states provid-
ing vocational rehabilitation services to undocumented workers who
have been injured in work-related accidents. Part I of the Article provides
context by analyzing some of the complexities of undocumented immi-
grants' lives in the United States. Part II discusses the history and eco-
nomics of vocational rehabilitation programs established by workers'
compensation systems. Part HI discusses ways in which immigration law
and enforcement contribute to the formation of this shadow population.
Part IV analyzes purported conflicts between vocational rehabilitation
programs and IRCA as they arose in Tarango v. State Industrial Com-
mission,18 a Nevada case that denied an undocumented worker access to
those services. Part V examines preemption of state law by IRCA, con-
cluding that IRCA does not preempt the most crucial parts of those stat-
utes. Part VI explores the constitutional issues that can arise when states
act to deny undocumented workers access to those services, suggesting
that such denial may be unconstitutional. Part VI also explores excep-
tions to deferential rational basis review, the continued viability of those
exceptions, and application of the exceptions to this issue. Part VII
briefly discusses the Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds v. NLRB,19 and argues that Hoffman should not result in denial of
masters degree in psychology despite the fact that the claimant retained the ability to work full time
as a security guard and was found capable of earning more than half of his pre-injury wages).
16. See Felix, 986 P.2d at 163-64. Little legislative history exists regarding the passage of the
Wyoming statute. However, it is interesting to note that the statute became effective January 1, 1996,
around the same time that California was struggling with the passage of Proposition 187, a law
designed to deny many state benefits to undocumented immigrants. Initiative Statute, Proposition
187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. (1994). Prior to 1996, the Wyoming statute included "aliens" within the
definition of covered employees, without regard to immigration status. See Felix, 986 P.2d at 164
(citing 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 121, §§ 2, 4).
17. Telephone inquiries in June of 2003 to a number of state workers' compensation agencies
revealed the following: Arizona (no retraining available since the agency would not be able to get
undocumented workers a job); Colorado (state does not allow it); Connecticut (workers' compensa-
tion available, but do not know about vocational rehabilitation); Florida (undocumented workers
qualify for workers' compensation, but cannot return to work without a permit; no vocational reha-
bilitation); Illinois (undocumented workers are eligible for retraining through workers' compensa-
tion, but there is no statute or case law on the issue); Maryland (department assumes undocumented
workers are not eligible for vocational rehabilitation); New Mexico (worker must be a resident and
have a valid social security number to qualify for vocational rehabilitation).
18. 25 P.3d 175 (Nev. 2001).
19. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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those services. Because vocational rehabilitation is a subset of workers'
compensation and parallels other workers' rights legislation, it is hoped
that this Article will also help to clarify the availability of workplace
protections for undocumented immigrants in other areas.
I. UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES
The undocumented immigrant population in the United States cur-
rently numbers around 8.5 million.20 Approximately five million un-
documented immigrants21 work in low-paid, menial jobs where the risk
of physical injury is high.22 Many industries consider them "essential
workers." 3 These are generally industries where the jobs do not attract
20. An estimate by Jeffrey Passel of the Urban Institute, based on 2000 census and INS data
placed the number of undocumented immigrants who live in the United States at 8.5 million. Mi-
chael E. Fix and Jeffrey S. Passel, Urban Institute, U.S. hnmigration at the Beginning of the 21st
Century: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims Hearing on "The U.S.
Population and Immigration" Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives, (Aug. 2,
2001), at http://www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=7321 (last visited February 12, 2004).
21. Most undocumented workers are concentrated in low-wage industries, where the dangers
of severe injuries are high, such as agriculture, food processing, meatpacking, garment manufactur-
ing, and construction. A study by the Pew Hispanic Center found that approximately five million
undocumented immigrants work in low-wage, high-risk occupations. The manufacturing sector
employs approximately 1.2 million undocumented workers; the service industries employ nearly 1.3
million; agriculture employs 1 to 1.4 million; the construction industry employs nearly 600,000; and
700,000 are employed by restaurants. B. Lindsay Lowell & Roberto Suro, Pew Hispanic Center,
How Many Undocumented: The Numbers Behind the U.S.-Mexico Migration Talks, at
http://www.pewhispanic.org/site/docs/pdf/howmanyundocumented.pdf (last visited February 12,
2004); see also U.S Dep't of Labor, Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey
(NAWS) 1997-1998, at 5, 22 (Mar. 2000) (finding that at least half of the agricultural workforce in
the United States is not authorized to work in this country).
22. In a recent article in the New York Times, Steven Greenhouse, relying on figures from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, found that Hispanics are much more likely than Whites or Blacks to work
at dangerous, low-level jobs. The article also found that Hispanics are twenty percent more likely
than Whites or African Americans to die from work-related injuries. The article attributed the differ-
ences in death rates to the fact that Hispanic immigrants are over-represented in dangerous occupa-
tions because "they will accept ... poorer working conditions than U.S.-born workers [i.e., legal
residents]." Steven Greenhouse, Hispanic Workers Die at Higher Rate, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2001,
at Al I (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The differences in death rates were also
attributed to the fact that Hispanic immigrants are "more likely to be employed by fly-by-night
contractors," and to fear of speaking up about dangerous things on the job. Id. Of course, the same
can be said for other racial or ethnic groups that share characteristics, such as language deficiencies,
and fear of deportation with undocumented Hispanics. A Government Accounting Office (GAO)
report on meatpacking plants in Iowa and Nebraska describes the dangerous work conditions in the
plants thusly: "The work in meatpacking plants is often hard and can be hazardous. The use of
knives, hooks, and saws in hot and cold areas on wet floors presents the risk of cuts, lacerations, and
slips; and the work presents the risk of repetitive stress injuries." See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT-CHANGES IN NEBRASKA'S AND IOWA'S COUNTIES WITH
LARGE MEATPACKING PLANT WORKFORCES 3 (1998). That report also found that "[a]ccording to
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, about 22.7 of every 100 full-time meatpacking
plant workers were injured during 1995." Id. The exceedingly low wages in many of these industries
have been documented by the federal government. A survey by the U.S. Department of Labor found
that in 2000, 100 percent of all poultry processing plants were not in compliance with federal wage
and hour laws. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, POULTRY PROCESSING COMPLIANCE SURVEY FACT
SHEET (2001). Similar findings were made for garment manufacturing. See Labor Department: Close
to Half of Garment Contractors Violating FLSA, According to DOL Report, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
No. 87, at A-7 to A-8 (May 6, 1996).
23. The Essential Worker Immigration Coalition (EWIC), a group that represents many labor-
intensive industries before the U.S. Congress, and advocates for immigration reform, predicts a
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legal residents, because of low wages, and because the work is unpleas-
ant, physically demanding, or dangerous.24
An understanding of the reality of the lives and interactions of un-
documented immigrants in the U.S. is crucial to the analysis of whether
vocational rehabilitation and other workplace protections should be made
available to undocumented workers. Undocumented immigrants occupy
the lowest rung on the United States' social ladder. During difficult eco-
nomic times they are easy targets for nativist forces looking for scape-
goats, condemned for taking jobs and social services away from Ameri-
can citizens and other legal residents. Undocumented immigrants are not
eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),25 Medi-
caid,26 Food Stamps,27 and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).28 How-
ever, despite the fact that they are ineligible for public benefits,29 and that
they tend to avoid contact with most state agencies fearing detection,
undocumented immigrants also present an easy target for those looking
for abusers of public services.3°
Undocumented immigrants are often depicted as lonesome adven-
turers who venture into the United States randomly, in search of any kind
of work. They are also depicted as criminals who, by definition, embody
a violation of the sacredness of the nation's borders, and its sovereignty.
Those depictions often serve to depersonalize legal decisions or policies
detrimental to that group, and help to avoid consideration of the real hu-
man consequences of those decisions.3'
shortage of labor in the next decade. Citing figures from the various industries it represents, EWIC
projects that in the next decade there will be a need for an additional 700,000 workers in the lodging
and hotel industry; 540,000 workers in the meat processing industry; more than 2 million workers in
general construction; 200,000 in home construction; 2 million workers in restaurant work; and
50,000 in roofing. In addition, 99% of chambers of commerce around the country point to the short-
age of workers as a priority issue among employers. Essential Worker Immigration Coalition
(EWIC), Documenting the Labor Shortage, (March 2002), at http://www.ewic.org/pdf/
EWIC_Documentingl.abor_.Shortage_%203_02.pdf (last visited February 12, 2004).
24. See supra note 21.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)(1) (2000).
27. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(0 (2000).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(l)(B)(i) (2000).
29. See Berta Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol & Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights, Local
Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An International Human Rights Critique of Immigration and Welfare
"Reform," 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 560 (1998) (describing federal welfare restrictions on aliens as
"a replay of the historically recurrent theme of safeguarding national resources from alien free-
loaders"). See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of
Immigration Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509 (1995) (analyzing un-
documented immigrants' ineligibility to major federal public assistance programs).
30. See Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal
Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 265-66, 269-70, 283 (1997)
(analyzing the stereotypes that control the debate over unauthorized immigration).
31. See Chicas v. Hott & Son Excavating, LLC, VWC File No. 191-21-91, 2000 VA Wrk.
Comp. LEXIS 651, at * 6 (Va. Workers' Comp. Comm'n Feb. 29, 2000) (remarking, after denying
benefits to an injured undocumented worker, that "we would find no inequity in failing to reward the
claimant for his ongoing illegal acts").
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The most common explanation for unauthorized immigration into
the U.S. is the "push" and "pull" mechanism. That is, undocumented
immigrants are "pushed" toward the U.S. by poverty and dismal eco-
nomic prospects, and "pulled" to the U.S. by an abundance of low-wage,
low-skill jobs that American employers cannot fill. While that explana-
tion helps to understand some of the picture, it is far from complete. The
reasons for undocumented immigration to the U.S. are much more com-
plex.
Undocumented immigrants generally arrive in the United States to
find well-developed social and economic networks composed of family,
friends, and, in many cases, willing employers. 32 Those networks com-
pose a formidable, yet partially hidden segment of the United States'
economy.33 Their members work, study, shop, and pay taxes.
34 Those
networks are only partially hidden because, in addition to the undocu-
mented immigrants themselves, they also contain legal residents and
citizens, many of whom are related by blood or marriage to members of
this shadow population.35 The existence of those relationships has
prompted a number of prominent commentators to urge decision makers
to consider carefully the effect of their decisions upon that vulnerable
36group. Consideration of those relationships is especially important in
the area of workers' compensation. While United States' immigration
policy has paid little attention to the interests of citizen children born to
32. See Michael Fix et al., Immigration Studies: The Integration of Immigrant Families in the
United States 7 (The Urban Institute, July 2001), at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/immig_
integration.pdf (last visited February, 12 2004); see also Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187:
Undocumented Immigrants and the National Imagination, 28 CoNN. L. REV. 555, 615 (1996) [here-
inafter Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187].
33. See, e.g., Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the
Need for Strengthening Worker Protection Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2180-81 (1994) (ana-
lyzing the underground economy, which is driven in large part by undocumented immigrants).
34. See Peter L. Reich, Jurisprudential Tradition and Undocumented Alien Entitlements, 6
GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1-5 (1992) (discussing the contributions to the economy made by undocu-
mented immigrants, who pay taxes but are ineligible for social services).
35. Fix et al., supra note 32, at 14-17, is a demographic study of recent immigrant patterns in
the U.S. The study found that one-half of all undocumented immigrant-headed households in the
State of New York contain children, most of them citizens. Id. at 14. According to the study, eighty-
five percent of immigrant families with children are mixed-status families, that is, families where at
lest one parent is a noncitizen and one child is a citizen. Id. at 15. Other findings include:
[1] Nationwide, 1 in 10 U.S. children lives in a mixed status family;
[2] Seventy-five percent of all children in immigrant families (those headed by a nonciti-
zen) are citizens;
[3] Twenty-seven percent of all children in New York City, and 47 percent of all children
in Los Angeles, live in mixed status families;
[4] In the state of New York, 70 percent of families with children headed by undocu-
mented immigrants contain citizen children;
[5] Sixty percent of the poor children in Los Angeles, and 30 percent of New York's poor
children live in mixed status families ....
Id. at 15-16.
36. Id. at 17.
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illegal immigrants when considering deportation of their parents,37 work-
ers' compensation law has retained those relationships as a central fo-
cus.
38
In a growing number of cases, courts and state legislatures have
come to realize that the everyday lives of undocumented immigrants in
the United States do not differ much from the lives of many legal resi-
dents, including citizens. 39 Thus, the United States legal system, particu-
larly the federal system, has adjusted to this permanent presence by cre-
ating a series of compromises that enable undocumented immigrants and
their children to participate to some extent in American society, even
while they retain the status of outsiders under United States' immigration
law.40 Some of these compromises are forward-looking 41 or based on
principles of fairness reflecting traditional American values,42 while oth-
ers, particularly in the area of workers' rights, also reflect a need to pro-
tect the integrity of American laws for the benefit of all workers.43
Workers' compensation systems in many states have managed to
navigate IRCA without much difficulty. However, problems with immi-
gration status often arise when undocumented workers are injured and
cannot return to work because the resulting disability is too severe, and
where the worker can only perform modified work or needs vocational
37. See Edith Z. Friedler, From Extreme Hardship to Extreme Deference: United States
Deportation of Its Own Children, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491, 492 (1995); Bill Piatt, Born as
Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
35, 36 (1988) (analyzing the constructive deportation of citizen children of undocumented immi-
grants when their parents are deported).
38. See, e.g., Turner v. Sunbelt Mfg., 763 So. 2d 770, 777 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
supplemental earnings benefits under workers' compensation was not forfeited during claimant's
period of incarceration given that claimant had two children who were dependent upon her); Jurado
v. Popejoy Constr. Co., 853 P.2d 669, 674 (Kan. 1993) (holding that worker's compensation death
benefits serve a dual purpose: first, they serve the employee's interest in assuring that his or her
family is protected against the loss of the worker's income (citing Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Indus.
Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 503-04 (1923)); they also serve the dependent's interests, but the
dependent's rights are derived from and dependent upon the employee's right); Garner v. Shulte Co.,
259 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (holding that the humanitarian purposes of the work-
ers' compensation laws extended to the protection of dependents, granting benefits to dependents
after father has become incarcerated and declared "civilly dead"); Thomas Refuse Serv. v. Flood,
515 S.E.2d 315, 317 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (same).
39. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218 n.17 (1982) (noting the U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral's statement to Congress that the federal government had "neither the resources, the capability,
nor the motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many of whom have become, in
effect, members of the community" (internal quotations omitted)).
40. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218 n.17.
41. Id. at 207-08 ("[U]nder current laws and practices the illegal alien of today may well be
the legal alien of tomorrow, and that without an education, these undocumented children, already
disadvantaged as a result of poverty, lack of English-speaking ability, and undeniable racial preju-
dices .... will become permanently locked into the lowest socio-economic class." (internal citations
and quotes omitted)).
42. See Jurado, 853 P.2d at 674 (demonstrating that death benefits from workers' compensa-
tion reflect a traditional American concern for the workers' families).
43. See, e.g., Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704 (11 th Cir. 1988) (finding that if the
Fair Labor Standards Act did not cover undocumented workers, employers might find them eco-
nomically advantageous to hire them to the detriment of legal resident workers).
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rehabilitation to regain earning capacity. Those situations represent the
most delicate interaction between systems designed to restore workers'
earning capacity, seemingly unforgiving immigration law, and the reality
of immigration enforcement. As Nevada demonstrates, the inability to
reconcile those apparent conflicting interests can create a disposable
workforce.
Nevada depends heavily upon the work of undocumented immi-
grants. The popularity of the state as a tourist destination has fueled tre-
mendous economic growth in the recent past, creating an insatiable de-
mand for workers in the service and construction industries. 44 Jobs in the
mammoth tourism-driven service industry include maid service, kitchen,
and custodial work. Those jobs are generally physically demanding with
little intellectual or economic reward. Similarly, construction jobs in
Nevada call for individuals to spend countless hours working outdoors in
extremely high temperatures throughout much of the year. While readily
available, these jobs are not always attractive to legal residents or citi-
zens. An Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") inspection of
eighty-nine construction firms in Las Vegas found that thirty-nine per-
cent of the employees appeared to be unauthorized to work in the United
States.45
Nevada readily provides medical coverage and lost wages to un-
documented employees under its workers' compensation laws, 46 but de-
nies vocational rehabilitation even in cases involving catastrophic work-
related injuries that result in severe lingering physical or mental disabili-
ties. Though not required by federal law or state statute, all injured work-
ers in Nevada are required by insurance providers to produce proof of
their ability to work in the United States, in the form of an 1-9 form, prior
to receiving vocational rehabilitation services.4 7 Curiously, this check is
not made before regular medical care is provided under the state's work-
44. A recent study by the Urban Institute tends to show that immigrants are not driven to
migrate by the existence of generous public benefits programs. They instead tend to migrate to areas
known for economic opportunity. California, a state with generous social assistance programs, for
example, experienced a reduction in the number of new arrivals in the 1990s. In contrast, the South-
east, Midwest, and Rocky Mountain Regions, all new growth areas, have experienced a rapid in-
crease in immigrant population. See Urban Institute, The Dispersal of Immigrants in the 1990s,
(Nov. 2002), at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=410589 (last visited February 13, 2004).
45. RICHARD M. STANA, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS-SIGNIFICANT
OBSTACLES TO REDUCING UNAUTHORIZED ALIEN EMPLOYMENT EXIST 4 (1999).
46. See NEV. REV. STAT. 616A. 105 (2003) ("Employee" includes "every person in the service
of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral
or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed, and includes, but not exclusively: 1. Aliens
and minors.").
47. See infra Part IV for an analysis of Tarango, 25 P.3d at 175. Professor Linda Bosniak
noticed that after the passage of IRCA, private insurance providers began asking injured workers for
INS 1-9 forms before they would provide job retraining benefits. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and
Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis.
L. REV. 955, 1033-34 (1988) [hereinafter Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership]. Thus, to many
insurance providers and self-insurers, IRCA presented an opportunity to save significant amounts of
money by providing a reason to deny vocational rehabilitation benefits.
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ers' compensation statute. But, demonstrating that vocational rehabilita-
tion services are inconsistent with the mandates of IRCA, Nevada
stopped providing vocational rehabilitation after passage of that statute,
even in cases resulting in catastrophic disabilities. In other words, Ne-
vada's workers' compensation system filters out undocumented workers
who are no longer productive, while facilitating able-bodied individuals'
return to work.
Thus, the most capable among the injured undocumented workers,
those whose injuries do not result in total disability and who do not re-
quire vocational rehabilitation services, are readily provided medical
attention, and are able to return to work where they are sorely needed.
And the most vulnerable among them, those whose lingering disabilities
rendered them incapable of returning to their former job, and who require
vocational rehabilitation in the form of retraining, education, or work-
hardening physical therapy, are denied the means to regain their former
earning capacity.
An effective examination of the issues that arise in this area de-
pends, in large part, upon a clear understanding of the nature of state
vocational rehabilitation programs under workers' compensation, and a
clear understanding of IRCA.
II. THE NATURE OF VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION UNDER STATE
WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
A. History and Economics of Workers' Compensation and Vocational
Rehabilitation
Vocational rehabilitation benefits are a subset of workers' compen-
sation. Vocational rehabilitation of injured workers who cannot return to
their former occupations after a work accident is mandated by statute in
just about every jurisdiction.48 As is the case with workers' compensa-
tion, the employer is required by statute to provide vocational rehabilita-
tion through an insurance provider (which in some jurisdictions is a state
fund) or through self-insurance. 49 Thus, although embedded in state stat-
utes, neither workers' compensation nor vocational rehabilitation bene-
fits are publicly funded welfare programs.50 They are instead substitutes
48. The State of Texas does not mandate employers to provide worker's compensation bene-
fits. Employees may instead elect to reject workers' compensation benefits and retain their common
law rights of action. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.034 (Vernon 2003).
49. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 3700 (Deering 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 616B.650 (2003).
50. See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58-60 (1999) (reasoning that medi-
cal treatment under workers' compensation is not a public benefit, but a private insurance obliga-
tion); Mclnnis v. Town of Bar Harbor, 387 A.2d 739, 743 (Me. 1978) (noting that "rehabilitation is
not a publicly funded program for retraining the handicapped," it is a cost imposed entirely on the
employer). But see Peter L. Reich, Public Benefits for Undocumented Aliens: State Law into the
Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REV. 219 (1991) (referring consistently to workers' compensation
benefits as "state benefits" in its advocacy in favor of making such benefits available to undocu-
mented workers).
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for tort remedies for personal injuries incurred on the job. Ordinary tort
remedies are available to everyone, including undocumented immi-
grants.
51
State workers' compensation statutes were adopted in the United
States around the turn of the twentieth century amidst an enormous tide
of work-related accidents caused by rapid industrialization.52 Prior to that
time, the traditional defenses of contributory negligence, the fellow ser-
vant rule, and assumption of risk doctrines had effectively shielded em-
ployers from liability.53 In the face of these formidable defenses, even
victims of catastrophic accidents caused primarily by the negligence of
the employer were routinely left without a remedy.54 Joining a national
call for reform, President Roosevelt stated in 1907: "[lIt is neither just,
expedient, nor humane; it is revolting to judgment and sentiment alike
that the financial burden of accidents occurring because of the necessary
exigencies of their daily occupation should be thrust upon those sufferers
who were least able to bear it."
55
Since its inception, workers' compensation law has been predicated
on the no-fault principle. That is, employees forego the opportunity to
pursue tort remedies for work-related injuries in exchange for a quick
and certain resolution of their claims, even though the recovery in some
cases would be greater in tort. Under this no-fault scheme employees
need only prove: (1) the existence of an employer/employee relationship;
(2) that the injury arose during the course of employment; and (3) that
the injury is causally related to the employment. 56 The defenses of con-
tributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule are
explicitly abolished by statute in most states.57 This compromise between
employers and employees means that workers' compensation statutes are
generally interpreted liberally for the protection of the injured worker. 58
51. E.g., Maldonado v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 So. 2d 464,470 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (hold-
ing that undocumented alien had right to no-fault automobile insurance benefits as "resident" under
state statutes); Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102, 1103-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979) (recognizing a body of case law upholding undocumented immigrants' right to access to the
courts to enforce an insurance contract that provided coverage for automobile accidents); Arteaga v.
Literski, 265 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Wis. 1978) (holding that undocumented aliens have a right to sue in
tort).
52. Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation and the Persistence of
Occupational Injuries, 31 Hous. L. REv. 119, 162-63 (1994) (crediting real catastrophes like the
deaths of 361 miners in a coal mining explosion in West Virginia and of 164 women in New York
City in the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire, for helping to jolt social consciousness to the need for reform).
53. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50 (1967) (analyzing the historical origin of workers compensation).
54. See Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers'
Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775 (1982).
55. Spieler, supra note 52, at 166.
56. Riddle v. Brevard County Bd., 286 So. 2d 557, 561 (Fla. 1973).
57. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917); City of
Hammond v. Biedron, 652 N.E.2d 110, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
58. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 (1932) (Workers'
compensation operates "to relieve persons suffering such misfortunates of a part of the burden and to
2003]
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Significantly, this compromise received overwhelming support from
employers, employees, labor unions, and the insurance industry.59 The
support by employers for workers' compensation has been attributed in
part to the need to ensure labor peace, but most commonly to the fact that
it essentially cost employers nothing. Initially, the cost to employers of
workers' compensation insurance was practically eliminated by reduc-
tions in wages paid to employees, and by passing some of the cost to
consumers. Workers, on the other hand, did not oppose a reduction in
wages because, in return, they received the certainty of recovery for
work-related injuries and avoided the uncertainty of tort litigation. Pres-
ently, most states require employers to purchase insurance from private
insurance companies or to qualify as self-insurers. 61 Employers are free
to pass the cost of workers' compensation insurance on to consumers of
products or services in the form of increased prices.62 Of course, work-
ers' wages are also susceptible to manipulation to reflect the cost of do-
ing business. Workers' compensation, therefore, continues to be pri-
vately funded.
B. Vocational Rehabilitation Services
Vocational rehabilitation programs are crucial components of state
workers' compensation systems. After medical treatment for the work-
related injury, vocational rehabilitation programs can help workers and
their families avoid life sentences of disability and unemployment. In
addition, by helping to restore the injured worker's earning capacity,
distribute it to the industries and mediately to those served by them. They are deemed to be in the
public interest and should be construed liberally in furtherance of the purpose for which they were
enacted and, if possible, so as to avoid incongruous or harsh results."); Dep't of Indus. Relations v.
Circus Circus Enters. Inc, 705 P.2d 645, 648-49 (Nev. 1985) (Nevada's "previous decisions have
stressed the need for worker's compensation determinations to be consistent with Nevada's public
policy of favoring the injured worker, who gives up his or her right to a tort remedy against an
employer in exchange for the protections of the worker's compensation system."); Virden v. Smith,
210 P. 129, .130 (Nev. 1922) (stating Workmen's Compensation Act, being remedial in nature,
should be given a liberal construction to accomplish the purpose intended).
59. See Price V. Fishback & Shawn Everett Kantor, The Adoption of Workers' Compensation
in the United States, 1900-1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 308-11 (1998).
60. White, 243 U.S. at 201-02 ("[J]ust as the employee's assumption of ordinary risks at
common law presumably was taken into account in fixing the rate of wages, so the fixed responsibil-
ity of the employer, and the modified assumption of risk by the employee under the new system,
presumably will be reflected in the wage scale.").
61. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 3, § 2.08.
62. Professors Larson and Larson described the purpose of workers' compensation thusly:
The ultimate social philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the wisdom of
providing, in the most efficient, most dignified, and most certain form, financial and
medical benefits for the victims of work-connected injuries which an enlightened com-
munity would feel obliged to provide in any case in some less satisfactory form, and of
allocating the burden of these payments to the most appropriate source of payment, the
consumer of the product.
Id. § 103[2]. This position is consistent with the opinions of state supreme courts that have decided
to award benefits to undocumented immigrant workers. See Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling
Corp., 672 A.2d 221,223-24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
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those services relieve pressure from state workers' compensation sys-
tems.6 3
The purpose of workers' compensation systems is the return of in-
jured workers to gainful employment, whenever feasible (i.e., rehabilita-
tion). In every state system rehabilitation is based on the employee's
ability to engage in an occupation earning wages similar to the em-
ployee's former occupation.64 Rehabilitation is composed of two phases:
a medical phase and a vocational phase. Once the worker has reached
maximum medical recovery or improvement, state vocational rehabilita-
tion statutes mandate a determination of the individual's capacity to
work. Permanently disabled individuals returning in a light-duty capacity
or after retraining are deemed eligible for vocational rehabilitation. Vo-
cational rehabilitation generally comes in three forms: (1) modified, or
light duty work with the same employer; (2) job placement assistance to
secure a job with a different employer; or (3) retraining in the form of an
educational program. 65 The principal focus of all three types of rehabili-
tation is restoration of the worker's earning capacity. That is, the eligible
worker is entitled to any of the three forms of assistance to enable him to
return to work earning a salary similar or substantially similar to the
wages he earned in his former job.66
To qualify for vocational rehabilitation, the worker must first dem-
onstrate the existence of a permanent disability that has diminished the
worker's earning capacity. The disability must manifest itself as a voca-
tional disability. That is, the extent of the worker's disability must be
measured by the extent to which the worker's ability to earn wages com-
pares to his former employment. Once the employee has demonstrated
the existence of a lingering disability, most vocational rehabilitation stat-
utes require an individualized assessment of the worker's potential to
return to gainful employment. The assessment includes an evaluation of
the worker's disability, his remaining skills and education, and a deter-
63. The objectives of rehabilitation are not restricted to helping injured workers. Rehabilita-
tion also serves to enable employers to avoid making further compensation by assisting the injured
employee to regain his earning capacity. See Lancaster v. Cooper Indus., 387 A.2d 5, 9 (Me. 1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-08.1-05 (2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-14-701 (Michie 2003).
64. See Ex parte Beaver Valley Corp. v. Priola, 477 So. 2d 408, 412 (Ala. 1985) (In "choos-
ing the form of vocational rehabilitation which is most likely to restore the employee to suitable
gainful employment," consideration should be given to programs "reasonably calculated to restore
the employee to suitable employment providing an income comparable to that earned prior to the
injury."); Owens Country Sausage v. Crane, 594 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (granting a
former truck driver rehabilitation services in the form of an educational program that would give him
"instrument rating" and thus enable him to earn as much as he had as a truck driver; the claimant had
earned $275 a week prior to his injury and $175 a week after the injury); Norby v. Arctic Enters.,
Inc., 232 N.W.2d 773, 775 (Minn. 1975) (determining that the test is whether retraining will materi-
ally assist in restoring the employee's earning capacity); Seader v. Clark County Risk Mgmt., 906
P.2d 255, 256 (Nev. 1995) (stating that a worker's acceptance of lump sum payment for permanent
partial disability did not waive his right to receive vocational rehabilitation benefits).
65. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.530 (2000).
66. See UPS v. Godwin, 418 S.E.2d 910, 912-13 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
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mination of whether retraining would help the employee regain an earn-
ing capacity similar to the one he formerly possessed. Many statutes re-
quire the employer to pay additional maintenance during retraining.67
Many statutes also require that the employer provide an allowance for
necessary travel.68
III. THE IMMIGRATION CONTROL REFORM ACT OF 1986 (IRCA) AND
SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION
IRCA was designed to address the problem of unauthorized immi-
gration to the U.S. by two principal means: (1) a massive regularization
process for eligible immigrants who had arrived in the country before
January 1, 1982; and (2) a mechanism of employer sanctions to deter the
knowing employment of undocumented immigrants.69 IRCA imposes
upon employers the duty to verify workers' immigration status, through
the INS form 1_9,7 0 and to keep records of the documents produced to
establish eligibility to work. Employers who fail to check workers' im-
migration status or to keep records expose themselves to civil fines.7'
Those who engage in a pattern or practice of violations by knowingly
employing undocumented immigrants can be charged criminally for their
conduct.72
Since its inception, IRCA has been criticized for turning U.S. em-
ployers into immigration deputies. However, in reality, even while pro-
hibiting the hiring of undocumented immigrants and threatening sanc-
tions against employers who hire them, the statute imposed only minimal
responsibilities upon employers. Though employers are required to ver-
ify the validity of documents presented to establish job applicants' au-
thorization to work, they are not expected to become experts in the in-
spection of immigration documents. Documents that appear valid on
their face suffice to discharge the employers' obligations under the stat-
ute.73 Therefore, employers charged with violations often invoke the
"good faith" defense with great success.74 Employers are further pro-
tected by a number of provisions in the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which excuse "tech-
67. E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 139.5(a)(5) (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.555.2 (2001);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-17 (Michie 2003).
68. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.315 (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-3-17(G); WIS. STAT.
§ 102.61(c) (2003).
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (2000).
70. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(ii) (2003).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(e)(4)(A) (listing fine range from $250 to $10,000).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(f).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(3) (2000).
74. Between October 1996 and May 1998, 2,100 employers were able to escape sanctions
under IRCA because the INS determined that the unauthorized aliens used fraudulent documents to
get hired. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS
UNDERMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION SYSTEM 2 (1999). Signifi-
cantly, the INS is required to give employers three days' notice before it can inspect the employers'
premises. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2.
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nical or procedural" failures to verify documents as long as those failures
resulted from a "good faith" effort." IIRIRA also requires INS investiga-
tors to notify employers of violations they have encountered and to give
employers ten days to correct the problems.76 That reality is not lost on
many employers, particularly those who operate businesses that cannot
attract a steady supply of legal resident workers because of the nature of
the job or the level of pay."
Employees, on the other hand, do not enjoy an equivalent presump-
tion of compliance with the statute once they establish that they are "eli-
gible" to work. Though the statute does not impose continuing obliga-
tions upon employers to ensure workers' eligibility, neither does it pro-
hibit further inquiries into their status. The statute prohibits discrimina-
78tory immigration-related employment practices. However, any risk of
discrimination can be avoided by requiring that all employees, regardless
of immigration status, re-establish eligibility to work prior to receiving
vocational rehabilitation services. At that time, the insurance provider
can perform a more careful inquiry into the worker's immigration status
by examining the supporting documents more closely to sort out employ-
ees deemed ineligible.
Employers also are able to exploit the unenforceability of the em-
ployer sanctions provisions of the statute. For many reasons, workplace
enforcement has been used only sparingly since the passage of the stat-
ute. Besides the inherent difficulty in prosecuting employers presented
by the good faith defense, the task of inspecting every workplace for
potential violations of immigration law is enormous. Historically, the
INS simply has not had the resources, staffing, or time required for such
a task.79 Because of these factors, immigration enforcement is largely
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(6).
76. Id.
77. Professor Kitty Calavita conducted a survey of employers who routinely relied upon
undocumented workers to fill unattractive jobs in Southern California. Kitty Calavita, Employer
Sanctions Violations: Toward a Dialectical Model of White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
1041, 1051-53 (1990). Many of the employers revealed that though they knew they were hiring
undocumented workers and they appreciated the risk of sanctions, their need for workers drove their
hiring decisions. Id. The work ethic of undocumented workers was characterized by the employers
as superior to that of Americans. Id. Many of the employers recognized that the jobs they were
offering were not particularly desirable and would be difficult to fill were it not for undocumented
workers. Id. One employer described the work at his plant and the difficulty of filling positions with
a domestic work force thusly:
These girls come in at four o'clock in the morning, and it's cold out there in the room that
they're working in. There's chicken meat all over the place, and it's not real desirable
work.... It's hard to find people that will do that. All the girls that we have out there are
either resident aliens or of Mexican heritage, and ... ah. .. they're willing to do it. Con-
sequently, if that's the type of people we have to get to do that type of work ... we would
have to hire them to get the work done.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
78. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2000).
79. See Gerald P. L6pez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of a Just Immigration
Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 669-72 (1981) (discussing the historical under funding of
the border patrol).
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restricted to border control. It is therefore widely understood among
employers that the odds of a workplace inspection, let alone a workplace
raid, or a successful conviction for violations of immigration law are
rather small.8'
In many instances these advantages can translate into economic lev-
erage in the marketplace for unscrupulous employers. Given all the pro-
tections offered by federal law, employers can create advantages over
their lawful competitors by relying on falsified documents to shield
themselves from IRCA liability, and then inquire more carefully into the
immigration status of their workers only once they become injured.82
That tactic can have an effect even in states that allow for workers' com-
pensation benefits. It can be even more pronounced in states that do not
provide for such benefits.
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE LAW AND THE IMMIGRATION REFORM
CONTROL ACT OF 1986
The question of whether state vocational rehabilitation programs
conflict with IRCA was addressed directly by the Nevada Supreme Court
in Tarango v. State Industrial Insurance System.83 The Tarango decision
illustrates the confusion that can be created by the interaction of a system
80. Immigration enforcement takes place primarily at the border. Of the 1,714,035 apprehen-
sions by the INS in fiscal year 1999, 97% were made along the Southwest Border. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1999 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 201, March 2002), at http://uscis.gov/graphics/
shared/aboutus/statistics/FY99Yearbook.pdf (last visited February 14, 2004). Similarly, in the year
2000, the INS dedicated most of its resources to border enforcement and the removal of criminal
immigrants. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE, ENFORCEMENT,
2000 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 2-4, at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/ENFOOyrbk/ENF200O.pdf (last visited February
14, 2004). Southwest border apprehensions were 1,643,679, a record high. Id. at 173. Removals of
criminal immigrants totaled over 71,000 while workplace removals totaled only 1,966. Id. For a
more detailed study of the impediments placed on the INS to engage in workplace enforcement, see
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: STATUS OF SOUTHWEST BORDER STRATEGY
IMPLEMENTATION (1999).
81. See Calavita, supra note 77, at 1064. A more recent example of IRCA's "good faith"
defense is a case involving Tyson Food Inc. Bill Poovey, Tyson Just the Beginning,
FREEREPUBLIC.COM, Apr. 2, 2003, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/88301 I/posts (last visited February 14, 2004). In an elaborate sting operation, agents for the
Justice Department delivered 136 undocumented employees to Tyson Foods. The Company was
charged with conspiracy to smuggle undocumented workers. Id. The government also charged top
company executives with knowingly hiring unauthorized workers. In defense of Tyson, its attorney
told jurors that the company could be hiring a "refugee from the North Pole or the man from Mars"
if the documents presented by the worker looked genuine. Id. (internal quotations omitted). After
deliberating for seven hours the jury found for Tyson. Id. One juror commented that there is "too
much gray area" for employers to determine who is legal, suggesting that there ought to be "stricter
guidelines" than requiring two identifying documents that look genuine. Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
82. Professor Linda S. Bosniak has explained the shield enjoyed by employers thusly: "In
effect, employers who are willing to alter their practices just enough to avoid appearing to disregard
the law totally, but who in fact continue to rely on undocumented labor, are insulated from the law's
sanctions provisions." See Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership, supra note 47, at 1017.
83. 25 P.3d 175 (Nev. 2001).
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designed to assist the worker to return to gainful employment and a
largely unenforceable (and at times purposely unenforced) federal statute
that prohibits employing undocumented workers. At first glance the two
systems would appear to be in direct conflict. However, much complex-
ity is lurking just beneath the surface. Many of these complexities were
manifested in Tarango. Thus, the case offers an effective vehicle to ex-
amine vocational rehabilitation principles in operation and to analyze this
problem.
Tarango, an undocumented worker, injured his back when he fell
from an eight-foot ladder while installing sheetrock at a construction
site. 84 As a result of the accident Tarango sustained a permanent partial
disability.85 After receiving medical treatment, Tarango was cleared to
return to the workforce. 86 However, Tarango's treating physician limited
him to permanent medium duty work in which he was to lift no more
than fifty pounds.87 Before his injury, Tarango was a drywall installer.88
That position required him to handle unwieldy sheets of drywall measur-
ing four feet wide by eight feet long and weighing eighty pounds or
more. In a normal day a drywall hanger can install between thirty and
forty sheets of drywall on walls and ceilings.
Since Tarango's occupation required more vigorous activity than
Tarango's medical clearance would allow, his physician recommended
vocational rehabilitation.89 The employer did not offer Tarango a light-
duty job.90 Though it awarded payment for a ten percent permanent par-
tial disability, the State Industrial Insurance System (SIS) denied
Tarango all vocational rehabilitation benefits, absent proof of a legal
right to work.9' SIS's determinations were affirmed twice by a hearing
examiner, and once again by a Nevada district court.92 The Nevada Su-
preme Court affirmed. 93
To support its denial of vocational rehabilitation services the court
relied on a Nevada statute that mandates:






90. See id. Light duty work is one of the options available in vocational rehabilitation pro-
grams.
91. Id. While employers are essentially presumed innocent as long as they review workers'
documents in "good faith," employees do not enjoy an equivalent presumption. Beyond the initial
review of documents and keeping of records, IRCA does not require employers to reconfirm work-
ers' authorization. However, the state does not prohibit the practice. Therefore, employers or insur-
ance providers are free to revisit the issue of a person's authorization to work at any time. Aware
that IRCA prohibits discrimination in its administration against individuals who may "look or
sound" foreign, providers require that every applicant provide proof of authorization to work to
determine whether the person is eligible for benefits and to what extent.
92. Id. at 178.
93. Id. at 177.
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[T]he following priorities in returning an injured employee to work:
1. Return the employee to the job he had before his injury.
2. Return the injured employee to a job with the employer he worked
for before his accident that accommodates any limitation imposed by
his injury.
3. Return the injured employee to employment with another em-
ployer in a job that uses his existing skills.
4. Provide training for the injured employee while he is working in
another vocation.
5. Provide formal training or education for the injured employee in
another vocation.
94
The court found that Tarango was not incapacitated by his inability
to lift more than fifty pounds.95 According to the court, that situation
presented SI1S with three options, "[flirst, SI1S could have returned
Tarango to the workforce" as provided by NRS 616C.530 (3), and
thereby cause an employer to violate IRCA by hiring Tarango. 96 "Sec-
ond, SI1S could have ignored the priority scheme established by the leg-
islature in the vocational rehabilitation statute and awarded Tarango for-
mal training based solely on his illegal status., 97 "[T]hird, SIIS could
have denied all vocational rehabilitation benefits. 98
Though the Court purported to base its denial of services to Tarango
on state law, IRCA was crucial to its analysis. Concluding that denying
Tarango vocational rehabilitation benefits was the only logical choice,
the court noted that because Tarango was unable to return to his former
job due to his disability, the first priority option was never at issue.99
However, according to the court, Tarango's ability to return to work in a
limited capacity implicated the second and third priorities, 0° which were
that the injured employee be returned to work, with the same employer if
the disability can be accommodated, or with a different employer in a job
that uses his existing skills. Accordingly, in the court's opinion, were
SUS to exercise either of these choices, it would expose employers to
sanctions for knowing violations of IRCA.
94. Id. at 179 (quoting NEV. REV STAT. 616C.530).
95. Id. at 180.
96. Id.
97. Id. This distinction was also drawn by Rivera v. United Masonry, Inc., 948 F.2d 774 (D.C.
Cir. 1991). However, in Rivera the court was careful to note that when the lack of "suitable alternate
employment" was a prerequisite to certain workers' compensation benefits, judges should consider
whether someone of like age, education, work experience, or physical disability could find employ-
ment. Rivera, 948 F.2d at 775.
98. Tarango, 25 P.3d at 180.
99. Id.; NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.530 (establishes the return of the injured employee to the
same employer as the first priority).
100. Tarango, 25 P.3d at 180; NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.530(2) (establishing the second priority,
which is the return to work to the same employer if the disability can be accommodated, while
subsection (3) establishes the third priority, which is the return of the injured employee to employ-
ment with another employer in a job that uses his existing skills).
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An alternative posed by the court would require SIIS to ignore the
priority scheme established by the statute, and to provide Tarango voca-
tional rehabilitation training based solely on his unauthorized immigra-
tion status by jumping directly to the lowest priority options of the stat-
ute. 0 1 However, according to the court, subsection (4) "necessitates pro-
viding Tarango with formal vocational training that runs concurrent with
his employment.'' 1 2 And, because IRCA prohibits Tarango's employ-
ment in the U.S., "SIS would be required to provide training outside of
Nevada,"' 0 3 which the court refused because "[t]he NIA was not in-
tended as a means to expand the agency's powers to award vocational
benefits beyond the borders of Nevada-let alone the borders of the
United States."' 4 In conclusion, the court maintained that Tarango
wanted a better career, not the one he left behind.'0 5
Importantly, the court based its denial of vocational rehabilitation to
Tarango principally on its disbelief that Tarango was incapacitated.
10 6
Though the court observed that Tarango's ability to return to the job
market was limited by his injury, the court emphasized that Tarango
could lift up to fifty pounds. 0 7 The court's focus on Tarango's ability to
lift fifty pounds to support its conclusion that he was not incapacitated
ignores a crucial element of vocational rehabilitation programs. The
question of whether incapacity exists is dependent on the nature of the
job and not some arbitrary measure of a person's strength. Indeed, the
court's observation that Tarango could participate in the job market in a
limited capacity is closer to the mark. While a lifting capacity of fifty
pounds may appear considerable in sedentary occupations, that limitation
essentially precluded Tarango from employment in the physically de-
manding construction industry. 1
08
As stated above, drywall installers must be able to carry and ma-
nipulate unwieldy sheets of material throughout the day. Those sheets
range in dimensions from four feet wide by twelve feet long, to four feet
wide by eight feet long, and, depending on the thickness, can weigh
eighty pounds or more. Sheetrock is generally installed on walls and ceil-
101. Tarango, 25 P.3d at 180.
102. Id. at 181.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.580 which states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this section, vocational rehabilitation services must not be provided outside of [Nevada]").
105. Id. at 180.
106. See id. ("[1]f Tarango was a documented worker, he clearly could have returned to similar
employment in the United States. Tarango was not incapacitated. Rather, the record indicates that
the only limitation on Tarango's abilities was that he should lift no more than fifty pounds.").
107. Id.
108. For purposes of this analysis, it is helpful to compare the work Tarango did prior to his
injury to work that he may be able to perform afterwards. An interview with Rafael Gomez, an
organizer for the Nevada Carpenters' Union, in November of 2002, revealed that a person with
Tarango's limitations would leave great difficulty finding a job in the construction industry that
would equal installing sheetrock. According to Mr. Gomez, Tarango's lifting limitation of fifty
pounds would render him virtually unemployable in construction.
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ings. In an eight-hour workday, a drywall hanger can install between
thirty and forty sheets of that material. The work of a drywall hanger
does not only require a great deal of strength, it also requires a great deal
of stamina and precision under tremendous physical stress. The Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL) classifies the job of drywall applicator as "very
heavy work."'1 9 That category is the most demanding in a list produced
by DOL, which is the source used by vocational rehabilitation experts to
determine the extent of an injured person's vocational disability. 10
Given his limitations, Tarango can no longer install drywall. The
best job Tarango could hope for in the construction industry would be a
clean-up job. However, even that job would require Tarango to lift large
amounts of weight numerous times a day. In addition, the pay rate for
construction clean up would fall well short of the rate payable for install-
ing drywall. The decision thus ignores the well-established principle that
Tarango and workers in his situation are generally entitled to assistance
to help them return to an occupation earning substantially similar wages
as their pre-injury position. Generally, "[a]n injured worker is not suc-
cessfully rehabilitated when he or she reaches maximum medical recov-
ery or improvement if the residuals of the injury, however well healed,
prevent re-entry into the job market in a position paying as well as, or
nearly as well as, his or her former employment."'
1 I
That principle is consistent with Nevada's workers' compensation
law. 1 2 It is also a principle that is routinely followed in other jurisdic-
tions. Under Nevada law an injured worker is eligible for vocational re-
habilitation if he does not have "existing marketable skills."" 3 Workers
with job-related injuries who do not possess existing marketable skills
are entitled to participate in programs designed to train or educate them
and to receive job placement assistance.1 14 Existing marketable skills are
109. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Office of Administrative Law Judges, Dictionary of Occupational
Titles, at http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/dot/REFRNCIDOT08B.HTM (last visited February 14,
2004).
110. See id. at Appendix C. The Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles
organizes work into four categories. A synopsis of the more general requirements of each category
follows: (1) sedentary work requires the exertion of ten pounds of force occasionally, and is gener-
ally performed from a sitting position; (2) light work requires an exertion of up to twenty pounds of
force occasionally, and/or up to ten pounds of work frequently with some other motion; (3) medium
work requires an exertion of twenty to fifty pounds of force occasionally, and/or ten to twenty-five
pounds frequently, and/or greater than negligible up to ten pounds of force constantly to move ob-
jects; (4) heavy work requires the exertion of fifty to 100 pounds of force occasionally, and/or
twenty-five to fifty pounds of force frequently, and/or ten to twenty pounds of force constantly to
move objects; and (5) very heavy work requires an exertion in excess of 100 pounds of force occa-
sionally, and/or in excess of fifty pounds of force frequently, and/or in excess of twenty pounds of
force constantly to move objects. Id.
111. Jane M. Draper, Workers' Compensation: Vocational Rehabilitation Statutes, 67 A.L.R.
4th 612, at § 2(a) (1989).
112. NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.555 (2003).
113. Id.
114. Id. In Nevada "existing marketable skills" include but are not limited to completion of an
educational program "if the program or course of study provided the skills and training necessary for
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defined as skills that would enable the injured worker to obtain employ-
ment at the same or substantially similar wages to those he enjoyed prior
to the injury. As the Tarango court observed, those skills can be put to
use elsewhere.' 15
When injured employees possess existing "marketable skills," Ne-
vada law restricts the services available under vocational rehabilitation to
job placement assistance. One of the most important measures of the
existence of "marketable skills" is whether the employee can earn wages
equal to or close to pre-injury wages." 16 Though the Nevada statute does
not set a threshold of post-injury wages under which a worker will not be
considered to possess "marketable skills," it does establish a goal in job
placement assistance, which is "to aid the employee in finding a position
which pays a gross wage that is equal to or greater than 80 percent of the
gross wage that he was earning at the time of his injury."
' 17
The court's reliance on Tarango's ability to perform work in a lim-
ited capacity as a disqualifier for vocational rehabilitation services is
inconsistent with the principal purpose of vocational rehabilitation pro-
grams, which is restoration of disabled workers' earning capacity. The
test used to determine eligibility is whether the employee is vocationally
incapacitated, not whether the worker is totally incapacitated in a medi-
cal sense. To require that the worker have no remaining work capacity to
qualify for vocational rehabilitation would fundamentally alter that prin-
ciple. A test requiring that the worker establish a total medical incapacity
before becoming eligible for vocational rehabilitation would result in the
denial of services to most injured workers. Such a result could not have
been what the Nevada Supreme Court had in mind when ruling against
Tarango.
Significantly, the court also ignored the fact that Tarango's em-
ployer did not tender a light duty offer, nor did it make an offer of proof
that another job would have been available to Tarango absent his immi-
gration status. 1 8 Section 2 of the statute is triggered only after the em-
ployer has tendered an offer of light-duty employment. 1 9 To satisfy the
the injured employee to be gainfully employed on a reasonably continuous basis in an occupation
that is reasonably available in this state." Id. Marketable skills also include completion of a two or
four year program at a college or a university, which results in a degree, completion of any portion
of a graduate program, or skills acquired in previous employment, including those acquired during
an apprenticeship or a program for on-the-job training. Id. The statute further states that "[tihe skills
set forth in paragraphs (a) to (d), inclusive, must have been acquired within the preceding 7 years
and be compatible with the physical limitations of the injured employee to be considered existing
marketable skills." Id.
115. Tarango, 25 P.3d at 178, 180.
116. See, e.g., Variano v. Dial Corp., 589 N.W.2d 845 (Neb. 1999); Peabody v. Home Ins. Co.,
751 A.2d 783 (Vt. 2000).
117. NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.555.2.
118. See generally Tarango, 25 P.3d at 175. An offer of proof that a light duty job existed for
Tarango would have been the subject of intense scrutiny by Tarango's counsel.
119. NEV. REV. STAT. 616C.530.
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statute, light duty employment must be similar or substantially similar,
wage-wise, to the injured employee's former job. 120 Though Tarango's
medical incapacity was not as compelling as one involving a more se-
verely disabled worker, he was not at maximum physical and vocational
capacity. 121 That analysis was supported by the dissenting judge, who
argued that the proper method to determine whether benefits should be
granted to Tarango consisted of an individualized assessment of
Tarango's incapacity.122
As precedent, the Tarango opinion provides little guidance regard-
ing the proper way to decide cases involving the right of undocumented
workers to vocational rehabilitation. Much of the case seems to concede
that those services can be properly awarded under the right circum-
stances. First, the court posed the question presented as whether "formal
vocational training must be denied if that training is required solely be-
cause of immigration status,"'123 suggesting that if training were required
because of the worker's inability to regain his earning capacity without
retraining, the answer may be in the affirmative. Second, the court also
conceded that the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act ("NIIA") covers un-
documented workers because it applies to "every person in the service of
an employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship,
express or implied, oral or written, whether lawfully or unlawfully em-
ployed."'124 Third, the court added with respect to providing vocational
rehabilitation services to undocumented workers, "it is our view that
although SIIS would be facilitating future employment for an unauthor-
ized alien by providing vocational rehabilitation benefits, there is no in-
dication that SRS is prohibited or would be punished under the IRCA for
its involvement.' 25 Finally, the court also seemed to contemplate that
vocational rehabilitation training could be put to use elsewhere. 126 How-
ever, despite those features, Tarango has been consistently interpreted as
a complete bar to vocational rehabilitation services for undocumented
workers. 127
Importantly, the court's sharp focus on Tarango's ability to lift up to
fifty pounds as evidence that he was not incapacitated128 appears to indi-
cate that the court sought to limit its decision to the facts before the tri-
bunal. As stated above, Tarango contains several strong suggestions that
120. Id. 616C.555.
12i. Tarango, 25 P.3d at 177.
122. Id. at 184 (Maupin, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 177.
124. Id. at 179.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. For example, the Nevada Attorney for Injured Workers reads the opinion as denying all
access to vocational rehabilitation to undocumented workers. Interview with the Nevada Attorney
for Injured Workers (Jan. 22, 2003) (on file with author).
128. Tarango, 25 P.3d at 180.
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the court was speaking strictly about a case where it did not believe the
claimant was incapacitated because he could lift up to fifty pounds.
29
Given the court's sharp focus on Tarango's lack of incapacitation, a more
plausible reading of the case as legal precedent would allow for voca-
tional rehabilitation if: (1) the worker had become incapacitated and
could benefit from retraining-though the retraining would be put to use
elsewhere; (2) if the need for rehabilitation was not due to the worker's
undocumented status; and (3) if the worker intended to return to the same
or similar occupation, not a better occupation than the one he left behind.
For example, a more compelling case would exist if the undocumented
construction worker was rendered physically incapable of lifting more
than twenty pounds due to a work-related injury.
V. ARE STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION LAWS PREEMPTED BY IRCA?
A. State Workers' Compensation Laws and IRCA
The question of whether IRCA preempts states' workers' compen-
sation or vocational rehabilitation statutes that award benefits to un-
documented workers will likely continue to cause confusion. The Nevada
Supreme Court's analysis of the preemption issue was incomplete. After
outlining the federal government's plenary power over immigration, the
Court concluded that "because of the federal government's plenary
power in the area of alienage, any legislation created by Congress-such
as IRCA-preempts Nevada's workers' compensation laws as those laws
have an effect on aliens in this state."130 As will be shown, a reasonable
reading of the Court's analysis would lead to the conclusion that IRCA
preempts Nevada's workers' compensation laws only to the extent that
they conflict with the federal statute. However, such a reading has not
been the case. Tarango has been consistently interpreted to hold that all
vocational rehabilitation benefits are preempted by IRCA. 131 That inter-
pretation of Tarango is inconsistent with traditional federal preemption
doctrine and holdings of several state courts.
32
Generally, under principles of federal preemption, when a state law
is in actual conflict with a federal statute the state law must yield to the
129. See id.
130. Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175, 179 (Nev. 2001).
131. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 3, at § 66.03. The leading treatise on the subject,
LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW, has interpreted the holding in the case to deny all
access to vocational rehabilitation benefits on the basis of preemption by IRCA because vocational
rehabilitation programs contain job placement components. Id. That reading of the case is also
shared by the Nevada Attorney for Injured Workers. See Interview with the Nevada Attorney for
Injured Workers, supra note 127. However, as will be shown, the critical component of vocational
rehabilitation services-retraining-is not preempted by IRCA.
132. See., e.g., Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 749 A.2d 1036, 1038 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000).
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federal scheme. 133 Whether state law is preempted depends on the intent
of Congress. 34 Congressional intent may be either express or implied. 35
Express intent to preempt state law is generally contained in preemption
clauses within the federal statute. 136 The question of whether implied
intent exists to preempt state law is dependent on Congressional intent,
as manifested in several sources.'
37
To determine whether Congress has impliedly preempted state law
courts can consider the wording of the federal statute itself and its legis-
lative history. 138 Courts may also consider the comprehensiveness of the
federal regulatory scheme.139 In addition, they may consider whether the
act of Congress has touched on "a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforce-
ment of state laws on the same subject."' 4 Finally, courts may consider
whether the state law produces a result inconsistent with the objective of
the federal statute.'
4'
Courts having analyzed the potential conflict between IRCA and
state workers' compensation laws have consistently concluded that such
laws are not preempted. 142 The most careful preemption analysis to date
involving potential conflicts between IRCA and workers' compensation
was performed by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Dowling v. Slot-
nik. 143 In Dowling the claimant, who had been hired as a live-in house-
keeper, severely injured her arm when she slipped on ice that had accu-
mulated on the defendants' driveway while walking to the defendants'
mailbox. 44 The claimant's injuries rendered her totally disabled for over
one year. 145 Though the defendants had been informed of the claimant's
133. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .
134. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
135. Jones, 430 U.S. at 525 (The intent of Congress may be "explicitly stated in the statute's
language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.").
136. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 62-63 (2002).
137. See Jones, 430 U.S. at 525.
138. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251-56 (1984) (relying primarily on the
text of the statute and its legislative history to hold that a state personal injury claim for based on
strict liability and negligence for the escape of plutonium was not preempted by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954).
139. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("The scheme of federal
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it.").
140. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
141. Id.; see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
142. Reinforced Earth Co., 749 A.2d at 1038. The defendant argued that IRCA preempts state
workers' compensation statutes and required the court to find that the claimant was not an "em-
ployee" under state law. Id. The court held that it does not. Id.; see also Dowling v. Slotnik, 712
A.2d 396 (Conn. 1998) (holding that the Immigration Reform Act does not preempt, either expressly
or impliedly, the authority of states to award workers' compensation benefits to undocumented
aliens).
143. 712 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1998).
144. Dowling, 712 A.2d at 399.
145. Id.
[Vol. 81:2
2003] BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 373
undocumented status, they nevertheless agreed to hire her, provide her
with health insurance, and pay her a salary of $400.00 per week. 146 In
violation of Connecticut law, the defendants never obtained workers'
compensation insurance. 47 The workers' compensation commissioner
found that the claimant's injuries had arisen out of and during the course
of her employment, and therefore were compensable under state law.
148
The defendants were ordered to pay the claimant disability benefits for
the period of total disability, prospective disability benefits subject to
medical documentation, interest on the past due disability benefits, and
any reasonable medical expenses incurred as a result of the fall. 1
49
On appeal the defendants argued that the commissioner's authority
was either expressly or impliedly preempted by IRCA.150 Ruling against
express preemption, the Connecticut Supreme Court reasoned that the
purposes behind its workers' compensation laws and federal immigration
law were not at odds when injured undocumented workers were provided
benefits. 151 The defendants argued that the requirement that they pay the
cost of medical care for their injured employee in the absence of a work-
ers' compensation policy amounted to a fine for hiring an unauthorized
worker and that such a "fine" was the equivalent of the state sanctions
preempted by IRCA's express preemption provision. 5 2 Noting that
workers compensation benefits are compensatory in nature rather than
"sanctions," the Connecticut Supreme Court swiftly rejected that argu-
ment.
53
Whether IRCA implicitly preempts the provision of benefits under
state workers' compensation is another matter. Regarding workers' com-
pensation in general, the court found that benefits under those statutes are
not implicitly preempted by IRCA. 154 Reasoning that "'a federal statute
implicitly overrides state law either when the scope of a statue indicates
that Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively ... or




149. Id. at 399-400. Prospective disability benefits for undocumented workers are generally
available, but recent decisions in Michigan and Pennsylvania may raise questions in other jurisdic-
tions regarding those benefits. For a discussion of the issues raised in those cases, see infra notes
481-83 and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 400. The defendants also made three other arguments: (1) that "the commission
lacked jurisdiction over the.., claim because [undocumented workers] are not included in the group
of 'persons' eligible for workers' compensation benefits;" (2) that the commission lacked jurisdic-
tion over the claim because the claimant's illegality had tainted the employment agreement, render-
ing it void; and (3) that the claimant's misrepresentations in her employment application regarding
her qualifications invalidated the employment agreement. Id. Those issues were also decided in
favor of the plaintiff. Id.
151. Id. at 408-09.
152. Id. at 403.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 403-04.
155. Id. at 403 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995)).
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that the United States Supreme Court has found implied conflict preemp-
tion "'where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state
and federal requirements ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.
' ' 156
Taking notice of the "strong presumption against federal preemp-
tion of state and local legislation," 157 the court pointed out that "[t]his
presumption is especially strong in areas traditionally occupied by the
states, such as public health and safety."15 8 Noting that nothing in the Act
gave any indication "that Congress intended the act to preempt state laws
whenever state laws operate to benefit undocumented aliens,"'159 the court
further explained that,
'it is clear from [the] legislative history [of the Immigration Reform
Act] that Congress anticipated some conflict between the new statute
... and various state.., statutes.... As explained in the House Re-
port: 'It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanc-
tions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any
way labor protections in existing law ... ' 160
As the Dowling court observed, IRCA's legislative history demon-
strates that the statute was not intended to deny labor protections to un-
documented immigrants when such protections are not in conflict with
the statute. In passing IRCA, Congress considered the consequences of
maintaining a permanent underclass of people without labor protections.
Congress recognized that denying labor protections would make employ-
ees without rights more desirable to unscrupulous employers, to the det-
riment of law-abiding competitors and legal residents, thus promoting
unauthorized immigration. Indeed, while addressing this problem, the
House Education and Labor Committee made clear that:
It is not the intention of the Committee that the employer sanc-
tions provisions of the bill be used to undermine or diminish in any
way labor protections in existing law, or to limit the powers of fed-
eral or state labor relations boards, labor standards agencies, or labor
arbitrators to remedy unfair practices committed against undocu-
mented employees for exercising their rights before such agencies or
for engaging in activities protected by existing law.
161
By safeguarding workers' protections for undocumented workers,
the committee sought to protect employment opportunities for legal resi-
dents and to ensure the ability of lawful employers to compete fairly in
156. Id. (quoting Freightliner Corp., 514 U.S. at 287).
157. Id. at 404.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Montero v. INS, 124 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 1997)).
161. H.R. REp. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662.
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the U.S. labor market. Indeed, the committee added that it sought "the
wages and employment conditions of lawful residents [not be] adversely
affected by the competition of illegal alien employees who are not sub-
ject to the standard terms of employment."'' 62 Congress further expressed
its desire to deter unauthorized immigration by protecting the rights of
undocumented workers when it authorized funds to the Wage and Hour
Division of the U.S. Department of Labor to enforce wage and hour laws
on behalf of undocumented workers. 1
63
B. Can Vocational Rehabilitation Laws Be Reconciled With IRCA?
Though the Dowling preemption analysis is useful, it is important to
note that the Dowling court did not have to analyze the full complexity of
workers' compensation under state law to decide that case. As stated
above, vocational rehabilitation contains a number of components that
raise more of a conflict with IRCA, such as modified employment and
job referral assistance. However, the crucial component of vocational
rehabilitation programs is the restoration of the injured worker's earning
capacity. Modified employment and job placement assistance (two prac-
tices that would violate IRCA) can easily be separated from those ser-
vices. Job retraining, perhaps the most critical component because it is
generally available in cases where the worker is seriously impaired, does
not conflict with the immigration statute.
The doctrine of partial preemption provides the best possible resolu-
tion to cases that involve partial conflicts between state and federal law.
When Congress has not entirely displaced state law over a particular
field, the state law is preempted only to the extent that it conflicts with
federal law.164 Silence within a detailed statute is usually interpreted to
mean that no federal rule on the matter was intended. 65 Consistent with
the doctrine of partial preemption California and North Carolina have
been able to navigate the conflicts between vocational rehabilitation and
IRCA by carefully separating the components of vocational rehabilitation
into job placement programs and training programs. 166 Foodmaker, Inc.
v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board involved an undocumented
worker who injured her lower back while attempting to pick up a sixty
162. ld.
163. See §111(d) of The Immigration Reform & Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). IRCA § 111(d) reads:
There are authorized to be appropriated ... such sums as may be necessary to the De-
partment of Labor for enforcement activities of the Wage and Hour Division ... in order
to deter the employment of unauthorized aliens and remove the economic incentive for
employers to exploit and use such aliens.
Id.
164. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
165. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85-87 (1994).
166. See Foodmaker, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 767, 769 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998); Gayton v. Gage Carolina Metals Inc., 560 S.E.2d 870, 873 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Ruiz
v. Belk Masonry Co., 559 S.E.2d 249, 251 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002).
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pound box of lettuce while working for Jack-in-the-Box.1 67 The em-
ployee was awarded workers compensation benefits, which were settled
by way of a "compromise and release."'' 68 The issue in the case was
whether the undocumented worker was eligible for vocational rehabilita-
tion benefits, although an offer of proof by the employer indicated that
the worker would have been offered a light-duty job absent her undocu-
mented status.169 Finding against the claimant on this very narrow ques-
tion, the Foodmaker court analyzed the question of whether vocational
rehabilitation benefits are generally available to undocumented workers
and the effect of IRCA on their availability.
170
First, following the result in many other states, the court noted that,
in general, workers compensation benefits are available to undocumented
workers in California171 because "[t]he act defines 'employee' as 'every
person in the service of an employer ... whether lawfully or unlawfully
employed, and includes: ... aliens .... Second, the court noted that
vocational rehabilitation plans are generally designed to return injured
employees to gainful employment. 173 However, separating vocational
rehabilitation plans into: "(1) plans in which the employee is immedi-
ately employable; (2) training plans; and (3) self-employment plans," the
court determined that undocumented workers who fall into the second
category should be eligible for vocational rehabilitation. 174
According to the court, providing vocational rehabilitation services
to injured undocumented workers in the first category would clearly vio-
late IRCA. 175 However, the court concluded that training plans for voca-
tionally feasible individuals (the second category) do not violate the im-
migration statute.176 In response to an argument that unauthorized work-
ers are "not vocationally feasible" because of their unauthorized immi-
gration status, the court held that nothing in the statute restricted "an
injured employee's potential job market to this country."' 177 Thus, un-
documented workers can "market" their work capacity in their country of
167. Foodmaker, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769.
168. id. at 770.
169. Id. at 770-71.
170. Id. at 775.
171. Id. at 771.
172. Id. (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 335 1(a)); Royal Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.,
48 Cal. Comp. Cases 104, 105 (Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Feb, 9, 1982) (declaring that illegal
immigrants are entitled to rehabilitation services); Cabral v. State Bd. of Control, 112 Cal. App. 3d
1012, 1018 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (Allport, J., dissenting) (stating that illegal immigrants are
covered by workers' compensation). Significantly, courts in other states whose statutes do not spe-
cifically cover undocumented workers (with the exception of Virginia) have nevertheless found that
they are covered as "persons." See Dowling, 712 A.2d at 409; Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers'
Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 102 (Pa. 2002).
173. Foodmaker, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772.
174. Id. at 773.
175. Id. at 777.
176. Id. at 775 n.13.
177. Id.
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origin. That statement is consistent with many observations made by the
Nevada Supreme Court in Tarango, and the decisions of other jurisdic-
tions. 78
Generally, the Supreme Court is especially reluctant to find preemp-
tion of state law when the case involves the compensation of victims of
tortuous conduct. For example, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,179
holding that state tort law was not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, the Court stated that when there is no indication that Congress
intended to preclude a state remedy, "[i]t is difficult to believe that Con-
gress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for
those injured by illegal conduct."'' 80 A similar result was handed down by
the Court in English v. General Electric Company.
181
Importantly, though IRCA is designed to occupy the field of em-
ployment within the undocumented immigration context, contrary to the
potential implications of the opinion of the Nevada Supreme Court in
Tarango,182 the statute does not speak to workers' health, safety, or abil-
ity to recover for work-related injuries. Courts that have considered this
issue have concluded that denying undocumented immigrants who suffer
work-related injuries access to the state workers' compensation system
contradicts the intent of the statute's employment sanctions provisions.
The intent behind those provisions is to discourage employers from hir-
ing undocumented immigrants. Denying workers' compensation cover-
age to those workers essentially makes them cheaper to hire, thus making
them more attractive to employers who are well aware of the low risk
involved in hiring from that group. Such a reading of the statute would
also produce negative consequences for legal residents who work along-
side undocumented workers. Taking away the obligation to provide
workers' compensation benefits to a class of workers also creates a dis-
incentive to provide safe working conditions, ultimately producing a
detriment to all workers.
The intent of Congress regarding benefits available to undocu-
mented workers is further informed by the passage of the Illegal Immi-
178. See, e.g., Garcia v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 939 P.2d 704 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (award-
ing a vocational rehabilitation lump sum a to worker who was injured in the U.S. but returned to his
dairy farm in Mexico).
179. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
180. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
181. 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (rejecting preemption of a state common law claim protecting
whistleblowers, even though the federal government occupies the field of nuclear safety, and cau-
tioning the court against seeking out conflicts between state and federal laws where none exists).
182. Though the Tarango court did not state explicitly that Congress had prohibited all manner
of vocational rehabilitation for undocumented workers, it appeared to suggest that was the case when
it noted that the power of Congress to regulate the conditions of entry and residency of aliens ex-
tends not only to the admission and naturalization of aliens, but also to the .'regulation of their
conduct before naturalization."' Tarango, 25 P.3d at 179 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)).
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gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IRIRA). 183
In that statute, Congress limited public benefits made available to legal
resident immigrants and also prohibited a number of public services to
undocumented immigrants. 184 Nowhere in that statute did Congress men-
tion that workers' compensation benefits should be denied to unauthor-
ized workers.1 85 Except for modified work and job placement assistance,
there is no indication that IRCA was designed to prevent undocumented
workers from receiving workers' compensation benefits, including re-
training under vocational rehabilitation programs. Indeed, to deny those
benefits would contradict the intent of Congress in passing that legisla-
tion.
VI. ARE STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION BENEFITS FOR UNDOCUMENTED
WORKERS CONSTITUTIONAL?
Moving beyond the questions of IRCA preemption of state statutes,
some states have attempted to explicitly prevent undocumented workers
from obtaining workers' compensation benefits by statute. However,
state laws designed to deny worker's compensation benefits, including
vocational rehabilitation benefits, to undocumented workers may be vul-
nerable to equal protection and perhaps due process challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Unlike prior
attempts to protect the rights of undocumented immigrants by arguing for
a heightened level of scrutiny of state action designed to discriminate
against this vulnerable population, this Article argues that, at least in the
context of workers' compensation, rational basis analysis provides the
most powerful defense of this group's rights.
The Supreme Court precedent that is commonly invoked by lower
courts and commentators to protect this group against discriminatory
state action is generally humanitarian and forward-looking, and the ar-
guments have been quite powerful and compelling. 186 However, the cases
cited appear either constitutionally vulnerable or incapable of being ex-
tended further to protect the rights of undocumented workers. Despite the
existence of conflicts between IRCA and some services provided for in
vocational rehabilitation statutes, and despite the fact that workers com-
pensation benefits are mandated by statute in most jurisdictions, the pri-
vate nature of workers' compensation benefits lends itself to a different
183. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
184. See Lewis v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 252 F.3d 567 (2d Cir. 2001).
185. See Lewis, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 157 (analyzing the federal welfare benefit restrictions im-
posed upon immigrants by iIRIRA).
186. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971) (supporting equal protection claims in favor of this group).
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kind of analysis than other benefits that are truly "public," and which
may constitutionally be denied to undocumented immigrants.
This analysis will assume, as it must, that workers' compensation
benefits and retraining under vocational rehabilitation programs are two
integrated components of rehabilitation. Therefore, the phrase "workers'
compensation benefits" includes all benefits that do not directly conflict
with IRCA.
A. Equal Protection and Immigration Status
The equal protection doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution is made up of two distinct strands.' 87 One strand
focuses on the nature of the right at stake, and the other focuses on the
status of the group whose rights are being infringed upon. 188 The level of
judicial scrutiny of state action grows in accordance with the importance
of the right at stake or with the status of the group affected.189 State stat-
utes that infringe upon fundamental rights receive the strictest level of
judicial scrutiny.' 90 Strict scrutiny requires that the government demon-
strate that its action is necessary or narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling state interest.' 9' Among other things, fundamental rights include
the right to travel 192 and the right to privacy. 93 Strict scrutiny is also ap-
plied to state action that classifies on the basis of "suspect classifica-
tions" such as race, color, and national origin, and, in a limited number
of cases, alienage. 194 State action reviewed under the strict scrutiny stan-
dard rarely survives. 1
95
On the other extreme exists the rational basis test, which generally
applies when neither a suspect class nor a fundamental interest is in-
volved. In general, that test simply asks whether the government classifi-
187. See Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recog-
nizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1210 (1999)
(recognizing that "[m]ost Supreme Court decisions invalidating governmental discrimination have
depended on the Court's finding a 'suspect class' or a 'fundamental right').
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating
that strict scrutiny applies to classifications affecting fundamental rights).
191. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that all racial
classifications, including benign ones, are subject to strict scrutiny).
192. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
193. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (declaring a Connecticut law that
prohibited the use of distribution of contraceptives unconstitutional as "repulsive to the notions of
privacy surrounding the marital relationship"); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)
(affirming the right to abortion and describing the right to personal privacy as encompassing certain
"activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
and education" (internal citations omitted)).
194. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (noting that rational
basis "gives way.., when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin").
195. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (commenting that strict scrutiny
is often "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
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cation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, calling for the
most lenient review of state action. 196 The third level of equal protection
analysis falls somewhere in between the two extremes, in what is re-
ferred to as "intermediate scrutiny." The intermediate scrutiny test re-
quires that the state classification bear a substantial relationship to an
important state interest to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 197 Intermedi-
ate scrutiny has been applied most commonly to state classifications in-
volving gender198 and legitimacy. 199 It has also been applied in a limited
way to a mix of interests involving the education of undocumented chil-
dren.2°° Significantly, several state courts have held that equal protection
principles under the Fourteenth Amendment protect undocumented im-
migrants' employment rights.20 1 However, those decisions have not
elaborated on the proper standard of review.
Though it is well established that undocumented immigrants are not
devoid of constitutional protection, they are not considered a "suspect
class. 202 However, a coherent constitutional doctrine defining exactly
what level of protection is afforded that group based on its status has not
been developed. The United States Supreme Court has spoken a great
deal to the constitutional rights of immigrants, but its analysis has not
been neatly compartmentalized as the above categories suggest, and has
rarely included the rights of undocumented immigrants.
Historically, undocumented immigrants have been considered tres-
passing outsiders with no claim to membership in the U.S. community.
Though not completely ignored, they receive much less constitutional
protection than legal resident immigrants. Resident immigrants, in turn,
do not enjoy full rights until they attain citizenship.0 3 Thus, a sliding
scale clearly exists with undocumented immigrants at the bottom. How-
ever, undocumented immigrants' position at the bottom of the scale does
not mean that government actors are free to treat them arbitrarily.
196. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993).
197. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
198. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
199. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461-62 (1988).
200. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
201. E.g., Nizamuddowlah v. Bengal Cabaret, Inc., 399 N.Y.S.2d 854, 857 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Dezsofi v. Jacoby, 36 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
202. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
203. Though the Constitution does not bar lawfully admitted non-citizen immigrants from
voting, no state allows them to vote. In addition, not all citizens are equal. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1, recognizes two kinds of citizenship-citizenship by birth and citizenship by naturalization. The
only, but perhaps most symbolically powerful, difference between the two kinds of citizenship is
eligibility for the presidency. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW § 5-18,
at 969 n.20 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that the inability of naturalized citizens to gain the presidency as
the "lone constitutional distinction between native-born and other citizens"). U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1,
cl. 5, provides that "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the
time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President .. "
204. In Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), the Court invoked the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to prohibit the punishment of unauthorized Chinese immigrants by imprisonment
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The sliding scale of constitutional protection, and its link to mem-
bership status, was highlighted in Mathews v. Diaz,205 where the Court
observed that "[t]here are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Four-
teenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 2 °6 Indeed, the
Court held that "[e]ven one whose presence in this country is unlawful,
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. 2 °7
However, in spite of that pronouncement, Mathews did not abolish dis-
tinctions between aliens and citizens, or even among classes of aliens.
That reality was highlighted by the Court's observation that:
The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected
by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion
that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship




The issue in Mathews was whether federal Medicare benefits that
are awarded to citizens can be constitutionally denied to legal resident
aliens. 20 9 Ruling against the resident aliens, the Court drew a distinction
between citizens and aliens by observing that:
In particular, the fact that Congress has provided some welfare bene-
fits for citizens does not require it to provide like benefits for All
aliens. Neither the overnight visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile
foreign power, the resident diplomat, nor the illegal entrant, can ad-
vance even a colorable constitutional claim to a share in the bounty
that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its own citizens and
Some of its guests. The decision to share that bounty with our guests
may take into account the character of the relationship between the
alien and this country .... 210
Therefore, while noncitizens and even undocumented immigrants enjoy
some protections under the Due Process Clause, and under the Four-
at hard labor without a judicial trial for violating U.S. immigration law. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
The Court held that all aliens, whether legally or illegally present in the United States, are persons
entitled to the protection of due process under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
205. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
206. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77 (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51
(1950); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238); see also Johnson v. Eisentranger, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)
(noting that aliens develop an ascending scale of rights as they increase their identity with U.S.
society). See generally A Theory of Alien's Rights, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1292 (1983) (describing the
sliding scale of constitutional protections available to immigrants depending on their status).
207. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77.
208. Id. at 78.
209. Id. at 69.
210. Id. at 80.
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teenth Amendment, depending on the matter involved, they are not
awarded the same protections available to citizens in every case.21'
Despite its negative result, the Mathews decision reinforced the
principle that all immigrants within the territories of the United States are
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.21 2 That observation was partly
responsible for the Supreme Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe.213 Still,
the extent to which the Constitution protects undocumented immigrants
continues to be a difficult puzzle. Except for the very general observation
made in Mathews that undocumented immigrants are not devoid of some
protection under the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has not spo-
ken in depth to the constitutional protections available to undocumented
immigrant adults. The Supreme Court's alienage jurisprudence has been
developed primarily in cases involving authorized resident aliens. Those
decisions have provided some guidance to courts and commentators in
cases or initiatives involving undocumented aliens, but have left many
unanswered questions.
The Supreme Court's alienage jurisprudence has been the subject of
much study. However, despite the many attempts to explain the Court's
approaches in a consistent and coherent manner, exceptions to what ap-
pear to be lines of consistent opinions continue to be created. A number
of scholars have attempted to explain the Supreme Court's alienage doc-
trine in terms of two strands.21 4 According to these scholars, one strand is
represented by Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2t 5 Graham v. Richardson,z16 and a
line of cases where the Court relied on strict scrutiny to strike down state
statutes denying access to economic benefits or limiting participation in
private sector economic activity on the basis of alienage.21 7 This juris-
211. Professor Linda S. Bosniak has described that duality thusly:
Undocumented immigrants live at the boundary of the national membership community.
They have long occupied a unique, deeply ambivalent place in the United States. Despite
their vital place in the American economy, this country has deprived them of recognition
as members in most contexts, but it has also extended them such recognition in others.
The law has both created and reflected this ambivalence, according a dual legal identity
to the undocumented. They are both outsiders and members, regulated objects of immi-
gration control and subjects of membership in limited but important respects.
Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership, supra note 47, at 956.
212. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78.
213. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler, the Court reaffirmed the principle that undocumented
immigrants are "persons" under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215. For a more in depth discussion of Plyler see
infra notes 231-306 and accompanying text.
214. See generally Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional
Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707 (1996); see also Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187, supra note 32, at
615; Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Galaxy
of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 601-16 (1994).
215. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
216. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
217. Graham, 403 U.S. at 376, 380 (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a state statute limiting
access to welfare benefits for lawfully admitted immigrants); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 12
(1977) (finding a statute barring resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education
invalid under strict scrutiny); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601-02
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prudential tradition has been characterized as the "personhood para-
digm. 218 The personhood paradigm presumes that citizens and nonciti-
zens share the same rights outside the immigration context.2 19 Thus,
[t]he Constitution assures [the alien] a large measure of equal eco-
nomic opportunity; he may invoke the writ of habeas corpus to pro-
tect his personal liberty; in criminal proceedings against him he must
be accorded the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; and,
unless an enemy alien, his property cannot be taken without just
compensation.
220
The second strand is represented by dicta in Sugarman v. Dou-
gall,22 1 where the Court, while striking down a New York law prohibit-
ing access to state civil service positions to noncitizens, nevertheless
noted the "State's interest in establishing its own form of government,
and in limiting participation in that government to those who are within
'the basic conception of a political community.' 222 The second strand
has been described as the "membership paradigm., 22 3 The membership
paradigm holds that, "[tihe Court will not employ strict scrutiny ... in
cases where the state, by the challenged classification, is merely engag-
ing in the ongoing process of 'defin[ing] its political community.'
224
That principle, best known as the "political function" doctrine, is based
on the idea that the state has a legitimate interest in reserving positions in
the self-governance process for U.S. citizens.225 Thus, a person must at-
tain full membership status as a condition of eligibility to participate in
the formation of the political community. An example is Foley v. Conne-
lie,226 where the Court, applying a rational basis analysis, let stand a state
statute prohibiting noncitizens from working as state police officers. 27
Alienage-based classifications created by federal law represent the
more rigid component of the second strand. Because the federal govern-
ment enjoys plenary power over immigration, federal classifications are
subjected to little or no scrutiny under a rational basis review.228
(1976) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate statutes prohibiting noncitizens from the practice of
licensed professions); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 646 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny
to invalidate exclusion of noncitizens from state civil service positions); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717, 721-22 (1973) (finding alienage to be a suspect classification).
218. Scaperlanda, supra note 214, at 712-13.
219. Id. at 739.
220. Id. (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 n.9 (1952)).
221. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
222. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
223. Scaperlanda, supra note 214, at 712-13.
224. Id. at 736-37 (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 643).
225. See id. at 737.
226. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
227. Foley, 435 U.S. at 299-300.
228. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84 (noting that illegal or temporary resident aliens could present
no substantial claims to participation in a federal medical insurance program); see also Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) (noting that in cases of federal alienage classifications the
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Though the concept of "personhood" continues to be invoked at
least implicitly from time to time, the "political function" exception to
strict scrutiny for state alienage classifications affecting resident immi-
grants' economic opportunity has been broadened so much as to hardly
resemble its original form.229 This erosion has created serious doubts
regarding the viability of strict scrutiny for this class.2
Relying strongly on principles of personhood, the Supreme Court
extended the reach of the equal protection doctrine to the most vulner-
able subset of the undocumented immigrant population in Plyler v.
Doe.23t In Plyler, the Court invalidated a Texas statute that withheld
funding for primary and secondary education to undocumented chil-
dren.23 The Court found the predicament of undocumented children par-
ticularly compelling, largely because their presence in the United States
was through no fault of their own.2 33 Observing that undocumented chil-
dren denied an education would grow up to become members of a per-
manent underclass, the Court subjected the state statute to a heightened
234level of scrutiny. The Court held that the Texas law, which not only
withheld funds for the education of children who were not "legally ad-
mitted" into the United States, but also authorized local school districts
to deny enrollment to such children, violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 235 Writing for the majority, Justice Bren-
nan stressed, "even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful,
have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 236 Importantly, the purpose of
the Texas statute was not to deny the children an elementary and secon-
dary education. Undocumented children who wanted to attend school
Court would presume that "any interest which might rationally be served by the rule did in fact give
rise to its adoption"). For an article making a strong case for a heightened standard of review for
federal alienage classifications, see Tamra M. Boyd, Keeping the Constitution's Promise: An Argu-
ment for Greater Judicial Scrutiny of Federal Alienage Classifications, 54 STAN. L. REV. 319, 321
(2001).
229. See Frederick D. Unger, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection--Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido, 31 EMORY L.J. 707, 739-40, 742 (1982) (tracing the expansion of the "political function"
exception to strict scrutiny in alienage classification, and concluding that suspect classification for
alienage is waning); Elizabeth Hull, Resident Aliens and The Equal Protection Clause: The Burger
Court's Retreat from Graham v. Richardson, 47 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 3-4, 41-42 (1980).
230. Unger, supra note 229, at 739-40, 742.
231. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20.
232. Id. at 230.
233. Id. at 220 ("[TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN.] § 21.031 is directed against children, and imposes
its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which children can have little
control.").
234. Id. at 222.
235. Id. at 221-22.
236. Id. at 210.
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could do so under the Texas law, but the cost would be $1,000 per pupil
per year.
237
The Plyler Court did not rely on strict scrutiny to review the Texas
statute because the case did not involve a "suspect class" or affect a fun-
damental right.238 Though the Court did not specifically articulate the
level of scrutiny applied to the case, a concurring opinion by Justice
Powell clarified that the Court had relied on intermediate scrutiny. Ac-
cording to Justice Powell:
A legislative classification that threatens the creation of an underclass
of future citizens and residents cannot be reconciled with one of the
fundamental purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. In these unique
circumstances, the Court properly may require that the State's inter-
ests be substantial and that the means bear a "fair and substantial re-
lation" to these interests.
239
The Court's focus on the narrow issue of education of undocumented
children was highlighted by its care to distinguish education from other
forms of governmental social welfare legislation. 240 Justice Powell, too,
was careful to keep the interests of undocumented young children sepa-
rate from those of undocumented mature children and undocumented
adults.24 1
Importantly, the Court, including the dissenters, emphatically re-
jected an argument by the State of Texas that undocumented aliens, be-
cause of their status, are not "persons within the jurisdiction" of the state,
and therefore have no right to the equal protection of the law.242 That
finding is one of the Plyler Court's most overlooked statements, but per-
haps one of the most important. Despite the fact that the statement had
been made in the past, 243 it clearly confirmed that the equal protection
doctrine "was intended to protect all persons . . . within the territorial
boundaries" of the United States, and rejected any notion that they could
be treated arbitrarily or invidiously.24
237. Of course, the $1,000 cost of tuition essentially denied the students an education. See Doe
v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 575 (E.D. Tex. 1978). Because of their poverty, none of the parents of
the children could afford that tuition. Doe, 458 F. Supp. at 575.
238. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 239 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
239. Id. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S.
412, 415 (1920)).
240. Id. at 221.
241. Id. at 240 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring) ("A different case would be presented in the
unlikely event that a minor, old enough to be responsible for illegal entry and yet still of school age,
entered this country illegally on his own volition.").
242. Id. at 210 (internal quotations omitted).
243. See, e.g., Mathews, 426 U.S. at 77.
244. Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual Agenda of
Constitutional Theory: Reflections On, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 329, 331
(1983).
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Unlike other oppressed minority groups in the United States, such
as African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Mexican-Americans, un-
documented immigrants have never been able to advocate for equal
treatment on the basis of membership in the national community.245
Thus, many of their small legal victories have been based on the need to
protect the integrity of the law, not on their ability to claim the existence
of "rights" based on their own worth as human beings. Therefore, the
Plyler Court's declaration that they are protected by the Constitution,
though limited by the phrase that undocumented status is "not a 'consti-
tutional irrelevancy,' ''246 represents a step forward for this class of "out-
siders." It enables them to avoid the label of non-persons and recognizes
their right to participate in a partial, but meaningful, rights-based dis-
course.
The Court established that undocumented immigrant adults enjoy
some protection under the equal protection and due process doctrines of
the Fourteenth Amendment, although the question remains: How much
protection? In his Plyler dissent, Chief Justice Burger, though agreeing
with the spirit of the decision,247 nevertheless stated unequivocally that
the issue at hand was most appropriately reviewed under the rationality
test, suggesting strongly that his answer to the question stated above is,
"not much., 248 Despite the compelling nature of the undocumented chil-
dren's education, the denial of which may lead to the formation of a
permanent underclass, Justice Burger would have deferred to the judg-
ment of the Texas Legislature under that standard.249 In fact, Justice Bur-
ger predicted that Plyler would likely stand for little beyond its facts be-
cause of the "unique confluence of theories and rationales" 250 manipu-
lated by the majority to arrive at the "right decision." So far, Chief Jus-
tice Burger's prediction has largely come to pass.
Fearful of the almost certainly negative impact of rational basis
analysis on undocumented immigrants, a number of scholars have argued
for an extension of Plyler's intermediate scrutiny test to state laws de-
245. Professor Linda Bosniak has explained this oddity in American civil rights activism by
pointing out that even progressive scholars must confront the fact that the undocumented population
does not quite "fit" into traditional civil rights paradigms. See Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187, supra
note 32, at 594. That is, even the most progressive civil rights advocates tend to have a national
identity from which all claims to equal membership are derived. See id.
246. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
247. Justice Burger prefaced his analysis of the proper role of the Court in this case thusly:
Were it our business to set the Nation's social policy, I would agree without hesita-
tion that it is senseless for an enlightened society to deprive any children-including ille-
gal aliens--of an elementary education. I fully agree that it would be folly-and wrong-
to tolerate creation of a segment of society made up of illiterate persons, many having a
limited or no command of our language.
Id. at 242 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 249-53 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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signed to discriminate against that group.251 Scholars' fear of rational
basis review of discriminatory state legislation aimed at undocumented
immigrants is well founded. The Plyler dissent, and changes in the
makeup of the Court since that case was decided, have contributed to that
pessimism.
2
Undocumented immigrants' vulnerability to discriminatory state
legislation is particularly evident during periods of economic distress.2S3
One recent example of their vulnerability was the passage of Cali ornia's
Proposition 187. 54 That law sought to deny all public social services,
256public elementary and secondary education, and publicly funded
health care25 7 to undocumented immigrants. The law, rather awkwardly,
also enlisted the state's law enforcement agencies to verify the status of
"suspected" undocumented immigrants, to notify them of their apparent
status and to inform them that they must either obtain legal status or
leave the United States.2 58 Public social services agencies 259 and primary
and secondary schools2 60 were assigned similar responsibilities. In addi-
tion, the law also required school officials to verify the immigration
261status of the parents of all school children.
Alarmed by Proposition 187, several prominent scholars accurately
pointed out that despite the neutral language of the legislation, supporters
251. See Randall Kyle Hawes, California Proposition 187: Will the Populist Mandate Survive
Constitutional Scrutiny?, 37 S. TEx. L. REV. 1391, 1398-1411 (1996) (arguing for the application of
Plyler's intermediate scrutiny analysis to several sections of California's Proposition 187, with the
exclusion of public social services); Stuart Biegel, The Wisdom of Plyler v. Doe, 17 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 46, 63 (1995) (suggesting that Plyler's intermediate scrutiny analysis would be
critical in a legal battle to challenge Proposition 187); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Gov-
ernment Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 1425, 1425-26 (1995) (arguing for the application of intermediate scrutiny for state action
designed to deny a basic level of governmental services to undocumented immigrants); Mitchell
Kurfis, The Constitutionality of California's Proposition 187: An Equal Protection Analysis, 32
CAL. W. L. REV. 129, 159 (1995) (arguing for the application of Plyler's intermediate scrutiny
analysis to the denial of health care and social services benefits).
252. Of the majority that decided Plyler, only Justice Stevens remains on the Court. Supreme
Court of the United States, Biographies of Current Members of the Supreme Court, at
www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
253. See LEO R. CHAVEZ, SHADOWED LIVES: UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 15 (1992) (discussing that waves of anti-immigrant sentiment tend to follow economic
downturns).
254. A copy of Proposition 187 can be found in the Appendix to Lolita K. Buckner Inniss,
California's Proposition 187-Does It Mean What It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A Textual
and Constitutional Analysis, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 577, 617-22 (1996). California's Proposition 187
was passed by that state's voters in 1994. Id.; see also Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration
Politics, Popular Democracy, and California's Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal
Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 633 (1995). The statute was enjoined in Gregorio T. v.
Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1995).
255. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West 1994).
256. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West 1994).
257. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (West 1994).
258. CAL. PENAL CODE § 824b (West 1994).
259. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5.
260. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215.
261. Id.
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of Proposition 187 were driven by racial animus toward immigrants of
color, in particular, immigrants from Mexico.262 The invidious racial
discrimination present in Proposition 187 led a number of commentators
to argue for a heightened level of scrutiny for certain types of state action
directed at undocumented immigrants.263 Proposing a heightened stan-
dard for state laws designed to deny basic governmental services to ille-
gal aliens, Professor Gerald L. Neuman warned that even laws as invidi-
ous as Proposition 187 would stand up to rational basis review.264 Con-
tending that both Plyler and Graham were correctly decided,265 Professor
Neuman argued for a limited extension of Plyler that applies a height-
ened level of scrutiny to state classifications designed to exclude illegal
aliens from a minimal level of government services.266
Professor Neuman argued that "the formal equal protection reason-
ing of the Plyler dissent would enable a state to declare 'illegal' aliens as
de facto outlaws, persons beyond the effective protection of the law. 267
According to Professor Neuman, under a rational basis analysis, in order
to drive out unlawful residents, "the state could withhold constitutionally
optional affirmative government services, that is, those services that the
Constitution does not oblige the states to provide in the first place. 268 At
that point, the only constitutional objection would take place in the realm
of equal protection, where, according to Chief Justice Burger, "'the state
may reasonably.., elect not to provide [undocumented aliens] with gov-
ernmental services at the expense of those who are lawfully in the
state.', 269 Professor Neuman therefore warned that a traditional rational
basis analysis "would deny [undocumented immigrants] the minimal
respect for their humanity that the state owes even to criminals-and
even to criminals whose crimes are more serious than the immigration
violations of which 'illegal' aliens may be guilty. '270 Similarly, in re-
sponse to other state laws that discriminate against undocumented immi-
grants, various commentators have argued for heightened scrutiny, or
even strict scrutiny, as the appropriate standard. 7'
262. See, e.g., Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187, supra note 32, at nn.7-10 (documenting the anti-
Mexican rhetoric of proponents of Proposition 187).
263. E.g., Hawes, supra note 251, at 1399-1400 (arguing that a heightened level of analysis
should be applied to Proposition 187).
264. Neuman, supra note 251, at 1445-48.
265. Id. at 1425.
266. Id. at 1425-26.
267. Id. at 1447-48.
268. Id. at 1446. Professor Neuman noted that "[miost government services are constitutionally
optional," listing education, police protection, fire protection, rescue services, emergency medical
care, public transportation, subsistence benefits, and mental health services as examples. Id.
269. Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 250).
270. Id. at 1448.
271. See, e.g., Mary K. Shannon, Jurado v. Popejoy Construction Co.: Determining the Consti-
tutionality of Disparate Awards of Workers' Compensation Death Benefits to Nonresident Alien
Dependents, 39 VILL. L. REv. 705, 736 (1994) (urging courts who have not yet ruled on the
constitutionality of disparate death benefit awards to nonresident alien dependents to follow Jurado
v. Popejoy Construction Co., 853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993), which applied strict scrutiny to such
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Driven by similar concerns, two state supreme courts, also taking
their lead from Bernal v. Fainter,272 Yick Wo v. Hopkins,273 Graham v.
Richardson,274 and Plyler v. Doe,275 have concluded that strict scrutiny is
the appropriate standard against which state action discriminating against
undocumented workers should be measured.276 The Kansas Supreme
Court, relying strongly on principles of personhood, invoked strict scru-
tiny to invalidate a Kansas workers' compensation statute that treated
nonresident alien dependents differently from other dependents for pur-
poses of death benefits.277
In Jurado, the Kansas Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
statute that provided for payment of no more than $750 to nonresident
alien dependents, but up to $200,000 for every other dependent, includ-
ing resident alien dependents.2 78 The Kansas Supreme Court also noted
that, "[a]s early as the 1920's, the United States Supreme Court recog-
nized that death benefits serve an employee's interest in providing for his
or her family., 279 Reasoning that all workers' compensation benefits
arise out of the employment contract and workers' compensation laws
that preexist a worker's death, the Kansas court ruled that "[t]he depend-
ents' right of action is derivative of and dependent upon the employee's
contract of employment," so that "[a]ll considerations focus upon the
employee and the rights and laws preexisting the employee's death...
,280 The court therefore found it completely appropriate to "approach a
determination of constitutionality upon our consideration of the constitu-
tional rights of the employee ....
The deceased employee in Jurado was a resident alien, meaning he
was an authorized immigrant.282 Analyzing briefly the three levels of
scrutiny used by the United States Supreme Court in equal protection
cases, the Kansas court concluded that strict scrutiny was the appropriate
test because the Kansas statute classified on the basis of alienage.283 Al-
though the statute referred to the alienage of the nonresident dependents,
Popejoy Construction Co., 853 P.2d 669 (Kan. 1993), which applied strict scrutiny to such classifi-
cations); Carrasco, supra note 214, at 607-08 (relying partially on Graham, 403 U.S. at 372, to argue
that state alienage classifications, including both authorized and unauthorized immigrants, must be
reviewed under strict scrutiny because aliens compose a "'discrete and insular' minority" (quoting
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))).
272. 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
273. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370.
274. Graham, 403 U.S. at 371-72.
275. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17.
276. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 676; De Ayala v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 543 So. 2d 204, 207
(Fla. 1989).
277. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 676.
278. Id. at 676-78.
279. Id. at 674 (referencing Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499,
503-04 (1923)).
280. Id. at 675.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 672.
283. Id. at 675-76.
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while the court centered its equal protection analysis on the rights of the
resident decedent, the court still had no trouble finding that the statute
created an alienage-based classification. 284 The court reasoned that be-
cause the statute provided less protection to an employee's dependents
on the basis of the dependents' alienage, "[b]y doing so, it creates a clas-
sification of employees based on alienage even though the classification
is not based on the employee's alienage. 285 Relying on Bernal v.
Fainter286 and Graham v. Richardson,287 the court concluded that strict
scrutiny was the appropriate test.288 Significantly, the court strongly sug-
gested that the result would have been the same, even if the deceased
worker had been undocumented, when it cited Plyler for the proposition
that such scrutiny applies even to residents who are in this country ille-
gally.289
In reaching its conclusion in favor of nonresident families of resi-
dent alien workers, the Kansas Supreme Court was obviously moved by
notions of fundamental fairness, fair play, and personhood embedded in
United States Supreme Court cases.29 Indeed, the court noted that when
it was first enacted in 1911, the Kansas workers' compensation statute
provided a death benefit of $3,600 to the deceased worker's dependents
and a death benefit of $750 for nonresident alien dependents. 291 The
court also noted with some dismay that, over the last eighty-one years,
amendments to the statute had raised the death benefit to $200,000, but
the $750 ceiling for nonresident alien dependents had remained static. 92
A similar situation arose in Florida in the case of De Ayala v. Flor-
ida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. where the Florida Supreme
Court found that a statute that provided up to $100,000 in death benefits
to U.S. resident dependents, and nonresident Canadian dependents, but
that limited death benefits available to all other nonresident alien de-
pendents to $1,000, violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.293 The $100,000 benefit was available to Canadians even if
they were in the country illegally.294 The De Ayala court, again taking a
broad view of the meaning of "alienage" classification, found that
alienage is "one of the ... suspect classes. 295 The court therefore rea-
284. Id. at 676.
285. Id.
286. 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
287. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
288. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 676.
289. Id. (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17).
290. See id. at 675; see also Shannon, supra note 271, at 733-35 (recognizing that the Kansas
court viewed Mr. Jurado's situation as "unfair").
291. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 676-77.
292. Id. at 677.
293. De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 205-08.
294. Id. at 207.
295. Id.
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soned that state alienage classifications are subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.2 96
Despite the fundamental fairness of the Jurado and De Ayala deci-
sions, their reasoning is vulnerable to attack because the U.S. Supreme
Court has never held that "alienage" covers every category of immigrant,
and has never held that state action affecting nonresident immigrants
(i.e., undocumented or unauthorized immigrants) must withstand strict
judicial scrutiny to constitute a valid exercise of state power. In fact, the
Court has held to the contrary.297 The Kansas court's analysis is directly
contradicted by Justice Brennan's declaration in Plyler that undocu-
mented immigrants do not compose a discrete and insular minority, 98
and ignores Mathews v. Diaz, which placed undocumented immigrants as
a class at the bottom of the sliding scale of judicial scrutiny of state ac-
299
tion.
Reliance on Plyler and Graham to argue that state action involving
undocumented immigrant adults must be analyzed under heightened
scrutiny must be tempered. Despite its wisdom and humaneness, Plyler
has been repeatedly criticized as lacking a solid constitutional founda-
tion.3°° Chief Justice Burger's prediction that Plyler would be essentially
limited to its facts appears to be coming true.3 ° ' Indeed, the Court has
refused to extend the holding of that case to other situations involving
rather compelling facts.30 2
One of the major weaknesses of Plyler is that even though the Court
did not identify undocumented children as a suspect class, or identify
education as a fundamental right, it nevertheless used heightened scru-
tiny to invalidate the Texas statute because the children involved found
themselves in their condition through no fault of their own.303 Indeed, if
that were enough of a justification to invalidate the statute, why not ap-
ply the same reasoning to school financing cases? After all, poor children
have absolutely no influence over the financing of their school district.
And, like the children in Plyler, many poor children find themselves in
grossly under-funded schools through no fault of their own, resulting in a
296. Id.
297. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
298. Id. at 219 n. 19.
299. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78-79, 82.
300. See Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Alien Children and Free Public Education: An Analy-
sis ofPlyler v. Doe, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 409, 428 (1983) (arguing that in order to achieve the result
it wanted in Plyler, the Supreme Court "did in fact play havoc with traditional equal protection
doctrine"); Perry, supra note 244, at 341 ("Resolving the issues in Plyler by introducing a more
activist standard of review out of solicitude for the principle of equal protection made no sense.").
301. See Hull, supra note 300, at 428.
302. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988); Martinez v. Bynum, 461
U.S. 321, 327-28 (1983).
303. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24, 226, 230.
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constructive denial of an education.3° Moreover, unlike the case of un-
documented immigrants, the law has not labeled the parents of poor
school children "criminals., 30 5 However, the Court has consistently re-
fused to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to state action discriminat-
ing against those children, applying instead the rational basis test, even
306when it results in a substantial detriment to that vulnerable population.
B. Traditional Rational Basis Analysis
The substantial degree of deference generally given to run-of-the-
mill economic or social welfare legislation under rational basis analysis
should raise a flag of caution to anyone urging its application to state
action that discriminates against undocumented workers.30 7 Indeed, in
most cases, mounting an equal protection challenge on the theory that a
court will find the classification constitutionally irrational would be con-
sidered unrealistic. 30 8 After all, under the rational basis test, a state need
only show that the classification has a rational relationship to a legitimate
governmental interest to comply with equal protection requirements.309
The formidable barrier to a successful challenge to state action
posed by the rational basis test was described by Chief Justice Rehnquist
in City of Dallas v. Stanglin.310 In that case, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that, "rational-basis scrutiny ... is the most relaxed and tolerant
form of judicial scrutiny . . . ."" Citing New Orleans v. Dukes for the
proposition that "'in the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious
discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently
with the Fourteenth Amendment, ' ' 31 2 the Court upheld a city ordinance
setting age limits on attendance to dance halls. 313 An even narrower ver-
304. See Amy J. Schmitz, Providing an Escape for Inner-City Children: Creating a Federal
Remedy for Educational Ills of Poor Urban Schools, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1639, 1662 (1994) (arguing
that the issue of unequal educational opportunities for poor urban children should return to the fed-
eral courts based on the theory that the Supreme Court adopted a novel equal protection approach in
Plyler).
305. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20 (noting, with respect to the parents of the children denied
public education, that "those who elect to enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law
should be prepared to bear the consequences").
306. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973).
307. Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational Basis Review, and the Impact of Clebume
Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L.J. 591, 603 (1999-2000) (recognizing that, under rational basis review,
"judicial invalidation of social and economic legislation should be an exceptional event").
308. Id. at 599.
309. Id. at 624.
310. 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989).
311. City of Dallas, 490 U.S. at 26 (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
In Dandridge, the Court stated:
[A] State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does
not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathe-
matical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'
Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
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sion of rational basis analysis was described by Justice Thomas in FCC
v. Beach Communications, Inc., where he stated: "In areas of social and
economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be up-
held against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably con-
ceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classifi-
cation. ' 314 Justice Thomas added further that "those attacking the ration-
ality of the legislative classification have the burden 'to negative every
conceivable basis which might support it.' ' 315 Moreover, according to
Justice Thomas, "because we never require a legislature to articulate its
reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional
purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction
actually motivated the legislature . ,3 6 Completing a grim picture,
Thomas added: "In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to
courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsup-
ported by evidence or empirical data.,
317
C. Exceptions to Traditional Rational Basis Review
The descriptions of rational basis review by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Thomas depict accurately the period from 1937 to 1976,
when virtually every state classification subjected to the rational basis
test was upheld.318 Indeed, it may be said that they reflect much of the
work of today's Court.319 However, reflecting an evolving sense of a
need to develop a meaningful rationality analysis, in a small but growing
number of cases since 1976, the Court has deviated from traditional ra-
tional basis deference to perform a more searching inquiry into the le-
gitimacy of the justifications for discriminatory classifications not in-
volving a suspect class or a fundamental interest. 320 Contrary to Justice
Thomas's suggestion that under rational basis analysis the Court will not
look into the motivation of the legislation, the Court has, on several oc-
casions, searched the record of the case to determine the legitimacy of
the relationship between the classification and the stated purpose of the
314. 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
315. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto
Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. See Mark D. Perison, Equal Protection and Medical Malpractice Damage Caps: The
Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1991, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 397,
415 (1991-1992) (asking, rhetorically, whether rational basis review is "any more than a mere judi-
cial rubber stamp").
319. Saphire, supra note 307, at 606-08. One of the most dramatic demonstrations of rational
basis deference can be found in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), where the court
hypothesized the possible goals of the legislature in enacting a statute--essentially denying the
plaintiff any meaningful review of the statute. Williamson, 348 U.S. at 490. A restrictive view of
rational basis analysis was demonstrated more recently in Heller, 509 U.S. at 320.
320. See Saphire, supra note 307, at 608-09.
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statute.21 In fact, in some of those cases, the Court has virtually ignored
justifications that appeared to be legitimate governmental concerns.322
Of course, any challenge to state laws denying workers' compensa-
tion benefits to undocumented workers on the basis of rational basis
analysis could face the formidable wall described by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 323 However, an argument based on a
heightened level of scrutiny, let alone strict scrutiny, will not see the light
of day.324 Plyer represents a historical anomaly, and it is very unlikely
that the Court will continue to stretch an already constitutionally un-
steady holding.325 In addition, the application of strict scrutiny to the
rights of undocumented individuals as a class, even under compelling
circumstances, would be unprecedented.326 It would mean that the dis-
tinction between citizens and non-citizens is beginning to disappear, a
327development that even progressive scholars seldom seek to achieve.
However, a number of developments in modern equal protection doctrine
indicate that undocumented immigrants may sometimes have a chance
against state power, even under rational basis analysis.328
Harmonizing the Court's exceptions to traditional rationality defer-
ence into some sort of predictable doctrine has been the subject of much
frustration for legal scholars. 329 However, a pattern has been discerned by
at least one commentator.33 ° Professor Richard B. Saphire has noted that
the more significant exceptions to rational basis deference can be catego-
321. See id. at 608.
322. See id.
323. See City of Dallas, 490 U.S. at 26; Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315.
324. See Scaperlanda, supra note 214, at 771 (suggesting that in future attempts to exclude
noncitizens from state benefits "the Court might overrule Plyler or distinguish it").
325. Id. at 749.
326. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223.
327. Most civil rights discourse involves rights that belong to all members of a national com-
munity. Advocates generally argue that denial of those rights essentially denies membership, or
benefits thereof, to the person affected. That argument is seldom made with respect to undocumented
immigrants. Instead, a more common argument is that the privilege of membership in the national
community would be devalued if all rights were made available to non-members. See Peter H.
Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship, 3 GEo.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 13 (1989). But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and 'Community
Ties': A Response to Martin, 44 U. Pr-r. L. REV. 237, 244 (1983) (making a case for an expansive
definition of "community").
328. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71 (1982) (holding that newer residents are
entitled to the same full benefits as long-term natives of Alaska); Song v. INS, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1133 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that an INS provision rendering a legal alien convicted of an aggra-
vated felony as ineligible for relief from deportation violates the Equal Protection Clause since
illegal aliens are eligible for relief).
329. See, e.g., Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from
the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 357-58 (1999) (discussing the ten
successful rational basis challenges to state action in the U.S. Supreme Court since 1971, and
concluding that the cases have largely stood on their own and did not result in changes to traditional
rational basis analysis).
330. Saphire, supra note 307, at 608 (identifying the various deviations from traditional ra-
tional basis analysis in the U.S. Supreme Court).
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rized into three types of cases.331 The first category announces the adop-
tion of a new standard of review. 332 The second is a category of cases
that, in addition to implicating the equality concerns of the Fourteenth
Amendment, also implicate other constitutional values.333 The third, and
most important category for purposes of this Article, is composed of
cases where the Court has concluded that the challenged classification
334
could not possibly have served a legitimate public purpose.
In several cases, the Court has concluded that the only plausible
reason for the passage of the statute is to disadvantage a particular group
because of animosity or prejudice toward its members. United States
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,335 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center,336and Romer v. Evans337 form the core of that category. In
each of those cases, the Court set aside the traditional deferential rational
basis analysis in favor of a more searching review of discriminatory gov-
ernmental action, while professing reliance on rational basis analysis.338
Significantly, the results in those cases cannot be predicted on the basis
of the Justices' political affiliations or perceived legal philosophy.339
Even Justices who advocate for a restrictive view of rational basis analy-
sis have joined some of the most controversial opinions in that cate-
gory.340 Though there is much evidence that those cases have not resulted
in a wholesale modification of traditional rational basis review at the
United States Supreme Court level,34 1 the cases have had a significant
impact on lower courts.
Though those cases may be described as anomalies, they do reveal a
continued struggle within the Court to define a meaning of "rationality"
that reflects a growing understanding of human dignity and values.342
The cases are only "outliers" because the people in the targeted catego-
ries have largely lived outside of Unites States society, not by their own
choice, but because of misconceptions and prejudices that denied their





335. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
336. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448.
337. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
338. See Farrell, supra note 329, at 374, 398-99, 409.
339. Id. at 414.
340. Id.
341. See Saphire, supra note 307, at 623-25 (asserting that the Court underwent an almost
complete retrenchment to traditional rational basis deference when it decided Helter v. Doe, 509
U.S. 312 (1993)).
342. See Allison Moore, Loving's Legacy: The Other Antidiscrimination Principles, 34 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 163, 197 (1999) (noting that Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer expanded the conven-
tional rational basis framework).
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1. United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno involved
amendment of the Food Stamp Act.343 The statute itself identified two
purposes: the stimulation of the agricultural economy and the alleviation
of hunger and malnutrition. 344 As the means to accomplish those goals,
Congress chose to exclude from the food stamp program any household
containing unrelated individuals. 345 Relying on rational basis review, the
Court determined that whether a person is related to other members of a
household was clearly irrelevant to those purposes.346 The Court found
evidence of other purposes in the legislative history of the statute, point-
ing to a Conference Report and a statement on the floor of the Senate
revealing that the purpose of the amendment was to exclude "hippies"
and "hippie communes" from the food stamp program. 347 Finding that
purpose impermissible, the Court declared that "a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legiti-
mate governmental interest."
348
Importantly, the Court also dismissed the government's argument
that the statute was designed to minimize fraud in the food stamp pro-
gram.349 In support of that position, the government had argued that
households with unrelated individuals were more likely to contain per-
sons who would fail to report sources than -hose households where every
member was related, and that those households were "relatively unsta-
ble," thus making it difficult to detect fraud.35° In response, the Court
focused on the statute's definition of household, which included homes
with a single individual, and the ease with which a person could avoid
accusations of fraud by simply changing his or her living arrange-
ments. 351 Taking that into account, the Court focused on the worst-case
scenario, where people so desperate for help could not afford the rela-
tively simple act of changing their living arrangements to become eligi-
ble for food stamps, and found the statute unconstitutional.352
2. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Similarly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court
unanimously invalidated a zoning ordinance that required a special per-
mit for a group home for people with mental retardation, but not for simi-
343. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
344. Id. at 533.
345. Id. at 530.
346. Id. at 533-34.
347. Id. at 534 (citing H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 91-1793, at 8 (1970), and 116 CONG. REC. 44,439
(1970) (statement of Sen. Holland)).
348. Id.
349. Id. at 535-37.
350. Id. at 535.
351. Id. at 537.
352. Id. at 538.
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lar housing for other groups.353 Writing for the majority, Justice White
rejected the application of heightened scrutiny by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, emphasizing that different treatment based on mental
retardation may be justified in some cases because of the reduced
abilities and differing special needs of members of that class.35 4 Stressing
that its refusal to recognize the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect class
did not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination,
the Court relied on Zobel v. Williams355 and United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno356 to hold that the "State may not rely on a
classification whose relationship" is so attenuated to its asserted goal "as
to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational. 357
Importantly the Court also agreed with Zobel and Moreno that some
objectives, such as "'a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group' ... are not legitimate state interests. 358 However, its search of the
record did not appear to reveal such a "bare desire" to harm people with
mental retardation, at least not outwardly.359 Instead, the Court found that
the justifications offered by the City Council for requiring a special use
permit for a group home for mentally retarded people and not for other
similar uses were based on stereotypes of people with mental retardation,
paternalism, an unsupported concern about safety in a floodplain, and an
unsupported concern regarding overcrowding. 360 Finding that such nega-
tive attitudes and fears do not provide legitimate reasons for treating
classes of people differently, the Court concluded that the ordinance vio-
lated equal protection, even under the rational basis test.36 1 In addition,
the Court also dismissed concerns over concentration of population, con-
gestion of the streets, worries about fire hazards, and the avoidance of
danger to other residents, concluding that requiring the permit in this
case appeared to be based on nothing more than irrational prejudice
against the targeted group.
3 62
Concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, Justice Marshall
reminded the Court that its rational basis analysis was "most assuredly
not the rational-basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc.," but was, instead, a much more searching inquiry into the legiti-
macy of the justifications given by the state for its classifications.
363
Sharing the Court's opinion of the overly broad lines drawn by the city's
353. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 447.
354. Id. at 442.
355. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 61-63.
356. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 535-36.
357. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
358. Id. at 447 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
359. See id.
360. Id. at 448-49.
361. Id. at 448.
362. Id. at 450.
363. Id. at 458-60 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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ordinance, Justice Marshall reminded the Court that despite similar im-
precision the Court had held other ordinances to be constitutional under
rational basis.364 Justice Marshall therefore urged the Court to character-
ize its analysis as heightened scrutiny.365
3. Romer v. Evans
In Romer v. Evans, the Court declared unconstitutional an amend-
ment to the Colorado Constitution prohibiting all state and local govern-
ment offices from enacting laws designed to protect people from dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Amendment 2, as the
legislation was called, was the result of a statewide referendum under-
taken as a response to a number of recently enacted city ordinances ban-
ning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in housing, em-
ployment, education, public accommodations, and health and welfare
367services.
Amendment 2 not only repealed the ordinances, but also prohibited
all legislative, executive, and judicial action at any state level designed to
protect the class.368 Relying primarily on voting rights cases, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court analyzed Amendment 2 under the strict scrutiny
test, finding that the law violated equal protection by depriving gays and
369
lesbians the opportunity to participate in the political process. On re-
mand, the state failed to convince the trial court that the statute was nar-
rowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. 370 The trial court en-
joined Amendment 2, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the rul-
ing.371
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that Amendment 2 violated equal
protection.372 However, unlike the Colorado Supreme Court, the Court
relied on a rational basis analysis.373 In support of the measure, the state
had argued that all it sought was to place gays and lesbians in the same
364. Id. at 459 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
365. Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
366. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36.
367. Id. at 623-24.
368. Amendment 2 read as follows:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, po-
litical subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orienta-
tion, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or en-
title any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota prefer-
ences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
Id. at 624.
369. Id. at 625 (citing Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993)).
370. Id. at 625-26.
371. Id. at 626 (citing Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994)).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 635.
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position as all other persons.374 To do that, the state argued that the
measure did "no more than deny homosexuals special rights." 3 " Finding
such a reading implausible, the Court pointed out the sweeping nature of
Amendment 2.376 The amendment was not only intended to nullify spe-
cific legal protections but was also designed to forbid reinstatement of
those laws and policies, putting gays and lesbians "in a solitary class. 377
Importantly, the Court recognized a modern trend in anti-
discrimination laws that reflected Congress' inability to protect individu-
als against some types of discrimination.378 Noting that Colorado's state
and local governments had passed many public accommodations laws
prohibiting discrimination against non-suspect groups,379 the Court
stressed that Amendment 2 not only barred homosexuals from securing
protection under the public accommodations laws, but also nullified spe-
cific legal protections for the class in all transactions in housing, sale of
real estate, insurance, health and welfare services, private education, and
employment. 380 The provision had the same effect in the public sector.
381
To demonstrate the extreme nature of the measure, the Court noted
that the amendment could also be read to deprive gays and lesbians the
protection of more general laws that prohibit arbitrary discrimination in
the public and private sectors. 382 As the Court explained, in the system-
atic administration of such laws, "an official must determine whether
homosexuality is an arbitrary" basis for a decision.383 Such a decision
would itself constitute a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
homosexuality under the amendment, denying homosexuals safe harbor
even in laws of general application. 384 Rejecting the state's position that
the law did nothing more than deny homosexuals "special rights," 385 the
Court found "nothing special" in the rights denied by the amendment.386
Instead, the Court pointed out that the amendment withdrew from homo-
sexuals basic protections taken for granted by most people.387 The
amendment thus created a class of outsiders, with few basic protec-
tions.
388
374. Id. at 626.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 626-27.
377. Id. at 627.
378. Id. at 627-28.
379. Id. at 628-29 (listing non-suspect categories that had been the subject of non-
discrimination measures like age, military status, marital status, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a
minor child, political affiliation, physical or mental disability, and sexual orientation).
380. Id. at 629.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 630.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 631.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 635.
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The Court based its conclusion that Amendment 2 did not satisfy
even rational basis analysis on two points. First, the amendment imposed
"a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group ....389
And, "[s]econd, the shear breath [of the amendment was] so discontinu-
ous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seem[ed] inexpli-
cable by anything but animus toward the class ....
With regard to the first point, the Court seemed to announce a new
approach to rational basis analysis when it stressed that even in the most
mundane of cases calling for the most deferential standard the Court "in-
sist[s] on knowing the relation[ship] between the classification adopted
and the object to be attained."'3 9' Citing a number of cases that upheld
classifications under the rationality test because they were narrowly
drawn and "grounded in . . . sufficient factual context[s] ' '392 that enabled
the Court to "ascertain some relation between the classification and the
purpose it served," the Court stated that such an inquiry "ensure[s] that
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group
burdened by the law."
393
Despite a characterization that did not conform to the traditional ra-
tional basis test, the Court's analysis provided some insight into a num-
ber of factors that might provoke a more searching inquiry under that
test. The Court noted that Amendment 2 was both narrow and broad in
its identification of people by a single trait and its blanket denial of pro-
tection to that group.394 Characterizing the amendment as unprecedented,
or rare, the Court explained that discrimination of such an unusual char-
acter requires special consideration to determine whether it is "'obnox-
ious to the constitutional provision.' ' 395 Stressing that laws that purport
to achieve equal protection "'through indiscriminate imposition of ine-
qualities' '' 396 run contrary to our constitutional tradition of equal protec-
tion, the Court concluded that a law making it "more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is
"1397itself a denial of equal protection ....
On the second point, the Court concluded that Amendment 2, and
laws like it, "raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed
is born of animosity toward the class" targeted.398 In support of Amend-
ment 2 the state offered two justifications. First, was respect for others'
freedom of association, in particular "landlords or employers who have




393. Id. at 633 (citing U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980)).
394. Id. at 633.
395. Id. (quoting Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).
396. Id. (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950)).
397. Id.
398. Id. at 634.
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personal or religious objections to homosexuality., 399 Second, was the
state's "interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination against
other groups., 400 Focusing on the severity of the harm inflicted upon
homosexuals, and stressing that the extreme breadth of the measure was
"so far removed from [those] ... justifications," the Court found it "im-
possible to credit" the justifications offered for the amendment. 40 ,
A recent United States Supreme Court opinion added a measure of
vitality to searching rational basis analysis. Lawrence v. Texas,40 2 in-
volved a challenge to a state statute banning same-sex sodomy .4 3 Find-
ing for the petitioners and against the state, the Court overruled Bowers
v. Hardwick404 and held that the statute violated the petitioners' liberty
interests under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 5 Concurring in the judg-
ment, but declining to join the Court in overruling Bowers, Justice
O'Connor argued that the case was more properly decided under the
equal protection doctrine. Relying on Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer,
Justice O'Connor reminded the Court that, "some objectives, such as 'a
bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group,' are not legitimate
state interests."40 7 Noting that the state's justification was the promotion
of morality, Justice O'Connor argued that moral disapproval by itself
does not constitute the legitimate state interest required to justify a ban
on homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy. 40 8 Scrutinizing the
justifications offered by the state, Justice O'Connor reasoned that be-
cause the law was so seldom enforced with respect to private, consensual
acts, "the law serv[ed] more as a statement of dislike and disapproval
against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior, ' '4°9 raising
"'the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of ani-
mosity toward the class of persons affected.' 410 Justice O'Connor, there-
fore, reached the same result, but with a completely different analysis,
confirming the viability of the exceptions to deferential rational basis
review reflected in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer.
399. Id. at 635.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
403. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
404. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (declining to recognize constitutionally protected right to engage in
homosexual sex).
405. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484.
406. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
407. Id. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534).
408. Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
409. Id.
410. Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 634).
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D. Adding Meaning to "Legitimate State Purpose" Under Rational Basis
Analysis
Instances when the Court will invalidate a state law designed to dis-
criminate against an unpopular but non-suspect group are rare. However,
Moreno, Cleburne, Romer, and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Lawrence demonstrate that there are times when the Court will act to
protect unpopular groups, even when indicia of the need for heightened
review are not present.
Those cases also demonstrate an evolution, albeit a slow one, of the
Court's understanding of modem notions of morality and fair play, and
of a related need to critically analyze the legitimateness of state action
when it harms politically unpopular yet non-suspect groups. Each of the
cases involved attempts to legislate against a perceived moral or charac-
ter flaw that does not generally exist in the realm of "traditional" (but
sadly uninformed) societal values. The decisions reveal that many of the
negative attitudes about those groups are based on prejudice and stereo-
types, which have been largely discredited by modem society. The cases
demonstrate the Court's insistence that society adjust its attitudes and
treat those groups with respect and dignity, reflecting an evolving sense
of morality and fair play. At their core, all three cases reject the state's
irrational disapproval of the moral worth of an unpopular group.
A major key in the decisions is the Court's rejection of unsupported
explanations for the discriminatory state action. An amorphous religious
objection to homosexuals in Romer was not enough to justify state action
that, not only denied protections, but also allowed invidious discrimina-
tion against that group.411 An unsupported belief that people with mental
illness were dangerous did not suffice to support state discrimination in
Cleburne.412 And the stereotypical image of the moral superiority of a
nuclear family versus a household composed partly of unrelated people
did not support denying food stamps in Moreno.4 13 In each of the three
cases, the nature of the discrimination, and the magnitude of the harm,
provided the Court early notice that it should engage in a searching in-
quiry of the justifications offered by the state. Those factors also put the
Court on notice that it should not engage in making up unsupported justi-
fications on behalf of the state. Instead, when indicia of invidious dis-
crimination are present, courts must "insist on knowing the relation[ship]
between the classification adopted and the objective to be attained.'"414 If,
as in Romer, the statute is "a status-based enactment divorced from any
factual context from which [courts] could discern a relationship to le-
411. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
412. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47.
413. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 538.
414. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
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gitimate state interests, 41 5 the statute must be found to violate the ration-
ality test under equal protection.1 6
Given the randomness of the three cases and the Court's reluctance
or unwillingness to follow them with similar decisions in other compel-
ling areas, some may fairly argue that the Court has been inconsistent in
its function as America's conscience. While that may be partly true, it
does not mean that the cases have lost their vitality. One of the true
strengths of the decisions, and a sign that they may endure and continue
to evolve, is that they were not the result of the usual five to four split
along ideological or political lines. Most significantly, lower courts' reli-
ance on these cases has resulted in a growing array of lower court deci-
sions consistent with those principles.417
The theme of Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer that the bare desire to
harm a politically unpopular group does not constitute a rational basis is
fully applicable to efforts to deny undocumented immigrants workers'
compensation benefits, including rehabilitation services. The Moreno,
Cleburne, and Romer line of equal protection cases would have been
aptly applied to California's Proposition 187, except that the close fit
with Plyler essentially ended the equal protection analysis.
Although there have been several episodes of state-sponsored dis-
crimination against undocumented immigrants in the nation's history,
Proposition 187 may be the most egregious example of state action
against that group in modern times. Most of Proposition 187 was de-
feated on the basis of federal preemption.41 8 Only the section of Proposi-
tion 187 that prohibited primary and secondary education to undocu-
mented children was subjected to what appeared to be equal protection
415. Id. at 635.
416. Id. at 631 (stating that the Court has "attempted to reconcile the principle with the reality
by stating that, if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [it] will
uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end").
417. The following cases relied on the combination of Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer to justify
a searching rational basis analysis: Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1997)
(selective prosecution on the basis of sexual orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause);
Esperanza Peace & Justice Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, Cause No. SA-98-CA-0696-OG, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6259, at *87-* 103 (W.D. Tex. 2001) (invalidating a decision by the City of San Anto-
nio to remove funding to the plaintiff because of its support of gay and lesbian issues); Weaver v.
Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1287-88 (D. Utah 1998) (finding that retaliation against a
teacher-coach's public expression of her sexual orientation violates the Equal Protection Clause);
Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering & Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp. 1260, 1276 (S.D. Cal. 1997); Baker
v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 872 (Vt. 1999). A KeyCite® search of the three cases separately revealed
that Moreno has been cited negatively ten times, and has been referenced positively 426 times;
Cleburne has been referenced negatively thirty-one times and positively 1,983 times; and Romer has
been cited negatively fourteen times, and positively 278 times. Search of WESTLAW, KeyCite
Service (Nov. 1, 2003). Though a careful analysis of those trends is beyond the scope of this Article,
they tend to suggesting strongly that, contrary to some scholars' pessimism, searching rational basis
review is alive and growing in the lower courts.
418. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 771 (S.D. Cal.
1995).
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analysis. 419 That section was overturned when the court invoked the
Plyler standard without much discussion.420 Therefore, one might rea-
sonably conclude that Plyler's heightened standard of review was crucial
to the Court's decision. However, a close reading of Section 7 reveals
that California's law was far more egregious than the Texas statute at
play in Plyler.4 2 1 Proposition 187, therefore, may have been a likely sub-
ject for a more searching rational basis analysis even in the absence of a
case such as Plyler.
Much like those who advocated the deportation of Mexican citizens
in the early part of the twentieth century,422 the proponents of Proposition
187 did not consider the high degree of harm that would be inflicted on
Americans. The Texas statute at play in Plyler amounted to the func-
tional denial of an education to young children because of the prohibitive
cost and the typically small incomes of the undocumented children's
423parents. However, unlike Proposition 187, the Texas statute was not
designed to force the undocumented children to self-deport.424 Also,
unlike the Texas statute, Proposition 187 required citizen children to
report the immigration status of their parents to facilitate their deporta-
tion.425 It further required untrained civilian teachers and school adminis-
trators to report "suspected" undocumented children, parents, or guardi-
ans, while failing to provide any standards to determine legal status.426
The statute also presumed that the state could arrange an orderly transi-
tion to the school in the child's country of origin within a period of
ninety days but made no provision for the administration of its man-
427dates. Implementation of Proposition 187 would have been devastating
to undocumented children, and many citizen children.428 The choice for
undocumented children and their families would have been obvious-the
children would have been kept from attending school.429 Implementation
of Proposition 187 would have also resulted in the same treatment for
many citizen children of undocumented parents.430 The creation of a cor-
nered, unprotected, and easily exploited underclass would have had a
419. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. at 774.
420. See id. at 774, 785 (invalidating Section 7 of Prop. 187, Exclusion of Illegal Aliens From
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, on the basis of a conflict with Plyler).
421. See id. at 785.
422. See generally JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION
OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954 (1980) (discussing in great detail the repatriation
of Mexican immigrants in 1954 by the U.S. government, which included many American citizens).
423. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228.
424. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. at 785 n.36.
425. Id. at 786.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 774, 790 (citing CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48215(d), (f)).
428. Id. at 774. Section 7 of Proposition 187 required schools to verify the immigration status
of children for "purposes of denying access to public elementary and secondary education." Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. Section 7, subsection (d) required the verification of the immigration status of un-
documented parents rather than children, which defeats the purpose of Section 7 "because the state
has no need to know the immigration status of parents in order to deny benefits to children." I&
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devastating societal impact, creating an even worse situation than that
which the Court sought to prevent in Plyler. Moreover, the potential sav-
ings associated with that initiative would have been much less than the
costs the state would have incurred to implement it,43 1 suggesting
strongly that the initiative was driven by a strong animus toward a de-
fenseless, politically unpopular group, rather than a desire to conserve
state resources. Such a result would have been inconsistent with the
searching rational basis review espoused in Moreno, Cleburne, and Ro-
mer.
E. Searching Rational Basis Analysis Invalidates State Laws Denying
Workers' Compensation and Vocational Rehabilitation Services to
Undocumented Workers
Significantly, though misstating the appropriate degree of scrutiny
in cases involving undocumented workers, the Kansas decision in Jurado
and the Florida decision in De Ayala offer powerful hints as to the proper
constitutional analysis in workers' compensation cases involving that
group. The De Ayala court suggested the proper analysis when it noted
that "[i]t is apparent from the face of the statute that it cannot pass a ra-
tional basis test, much less the heightened scrutiny applicable when offi-
cial discrimination occurs based on alienage. 432 Perhaps hinting that the
motive behind the statute was race-based, the court stated with some
frustration: "What possible state purpose would justify giving a benefit to
nonresident Canadians that is denied Mexicans?,, 433 The court found that
the proffered explanation, that "this is not an unreasonable distinction
given the fact that the U.S. and Canada share one of the largest unpro-
tected borders in the entire world," did not satisfy the rational basis
test.434
The Jurado court's analysis of the constitutional issues provides a
more careful dissection of the critical factors that should control judicial
review of state laws designed to deny workers' compensation benefits to
undocumented workers. In Jurado, the defendants, a construction com-
pany and the workers' compensation insurance provider, argued that the
statute in question would withstand "even the strictest scrutiny., 435 In
support, the defendants cited the "insurmountable task" that the state
would be forced to face of "administering benefits to citizens of foreign
countries, dealing with foreign governments, ascertaining choice of law
rules with regard to issues such as marriage and paternity, and insuring
dependents received the benefits to which they are entitled., 436 In addi-
431. Professor Kevin Johnson revealed that the savings derived from Proposition 187 were far
less than the costs of implementation. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 1568.
432. De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 207.
433. Id.
434. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
435. Jurado, 853 P.2d at 677.
436. Id.
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tion, the defendants cited the "prevention of fraud and extreme financial
hardship on the citizens, employers, and insurance carriers of Kansas as
compelling interests that justify the statute's classification.37
In response, the court showed little sympathy for claims of adminis-
trative efficiency, noting that the workers' compensation system already
awarded some benefits to people in situations similar to Jurado's fam-
ily.438 The court also noted that the burden of proof regarding the need
for workers' compensation benefits was on the claimant, dismissing
many of the defendant's concerns over the difficulties of administering
the system's requirements to people in a foreign country.439 In addition,
reflecting the private nature of workers' compensation coverage, the
court emphasized that the interests represented were those of the em-
ployer and the insurance provider and not those of the State of Kansas.
44
0
The most common characteristics shared by Moreno, Cleburne, and
Romer are the Court's refusal to accept mere animosity against an un-
popular group as a legitimate state interest and the Court's willingness to
review the justifications offered by the state once it has been alerted that
the classification affects a politically unpopular group. Because of the
group's inability to defend itself in the political process, mere animosity
has driven many government initiatives against undocumented immi-
grants.
1. Animus
Whether state action is driven by antipathy and a bare desire to
harm a politically unpopular group is difficult to determine by a literal
reading of legislation. However, the Court has demonstrated that animus
toward a politically unpopular group can also be identified by analyzing
societal attitudes and conduct toward the targeted group. Unlike the ho-
mophobic tone of the initiative campaign against homosexuals in Romer,
and the revealing statements against "hippies" in the legislative history of
the Food Stamp Act in Moreno, the Court in Cleburne could not point to
a "smoking gun" to demonstrate that the zoning ordinance in the case
was specifically designed to ostracize people with mental retardation.441
The Cleburne Court instead focused almost entirely on the negative atti-





441. City of Clebume, 473 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
Clebume's ordinance sweeps too broadly to dispel the suspicion that it rests on a bare de-
sire to treat the retarded as outsiders, pariahs who do not belong in the community. The
Court, while disclaiming that special scrutiny is necessary or warranted, reaches the same
conclusion. Rather than striking the ordinance down, however, the Court invalidates it
merely as applied to respondents.
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such as neighboring property owners and elderly residents, as well as
concerns over possible harassment of the residents by students, and con-
cerns over legal responsibility and overcrowding, demonstrating that
animus toward a politically unpopular group can take on many forms,
and can come from different directions." 2
Today, few groups can claim to be closer to the bottom than un-
documented immigrants. No other group faces more barriers to participa-
tion in the political process. They cannot vote, and political mobilization
only exposes them to detection and possible separation from friends,
family, and jobs.443 They are especially vulnerable when they are per-
ceived to be benefiting from social programs while draining resources
that should only be made available to citizens. 4" As Proposition 187
demonstrated, even though they are ineligible for most public services
and benefits, and they pay taxes, undocumented immigrants have been
easy targets for those looking for "scapegoats" for states' economic trou-
bles.445
As recently as 1982, the State of Texas argued that undocumented
immigrants were not persons "within its jurisdiction."" 6 While it is diffi-
cult to imagine that the State of Texas sought the full consequences of
such a finding, such as the ability to discriminate arbitrarily or even in-
vidiously against that segment of the population, the state's willingness
to raise that argument demonstrated its low opinion of the group. A simi-
lar observation can be made about Proposition 187. That law was passed
while its proponents were fully aware that much of the initiative con-
flicted with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Plyler. In fact, the ini-
tiative may be fairly interpreted as a challenge to the Plyler Court based
on the idea that states should be free to legislate against this unpopular
group, notwithstanding the invidiousness of that discrimination.
2. Legitimate State Purpose?
Determining whether a legitimate state purpose is involved when
undocumented workers are denied access to workers' compensation
benefits requires a careful review of the economics of workers' compen-
sation. As previously explained, workers' compensation benefits are pri-
vate benefits." 7 Although they are embedded in state statutes, those
benefits, unlike education, food stamps, or Medicare, are not public
benefits. 448 The state's economic interests are not implicated when work-
ers' compensation benefits are provided. The cost of workers' compensa-
442. Id. at 448-49.
443. Johnson, supra note 30, at1514.
444. Id. at 1512-13.
445. Id. at 1571.
446. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 211 (internal quotations omitted).
447. See supra note 50.
448. Id.
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tion reflects the employers' cost of doing business. That cost can both be
passed to the consumer and reflected in workers' wages.449 Every claim
denied represents a potential windfall for the insurance provider or self-
insurer and a potential rebate of premiums to the employer.45 °
The private nature of state workers' compensation systems was
highlighted in American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sulli-
van.4 51 In that case, the plaintiff attempted to establish that denial of
benefits by the private insurer was attributable to state action in an equal
protection claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.452 The plaintiff
argued that "workers' compensation benefits are state-mandated 'public
benefits,' and that the State has delegated the provision of these 'public
benefits' to private insurers. '453 The Federal District Court disagreed,
dismissing the private insurers from the case because they were not state
actors.454
Despite the longstanding view that state workers' compensation
benefits are private obligations, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the trial court, holding that insurers "'providing public benefits
which honor State entitlements ... become an arm of the State, fulfilling
a uniquely governmental obligation .... , The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, rejecting the authority offered by the Third Circuit because the
case cited involved the delegation to private physicians of a constitu-
456tional obligation to provide treatment to injured inmates. In contrast,
according to the Court, nothing in the Pennsylvania Constitution obli-
gated the state to provide medical treatment or workers' compensation
benefits to injured workers. 57 Instead, the state "workers' compensation
law impose[d] that obligation on employers. ' 58
449. See supra note 60.
450. Workers' compensation policies are generally experience-rated. Their cost rises or drops
dependent on the number of accidents reported. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 3, at § 150.06.
451. 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
452. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 47-48.
453. Id. at 55 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)).
454. Id. at 48.
455. Id. at 55 (quoting Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158, 168 (3d Cir. 1998)). Curiously, the
belief that workers' compensation payments are public benefits continues to be held by a number of
jurists. See Alvarez Martinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 720 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1986) (concerning death
benefits, where the court erroneously characterized workers' compensation benefits as "part of
several interrelated social welfare enactments"). Alvarez Martinez involved the Utah workers' com-
pensation statute, which treated U.S. and Canadian residents the same but provided for one-half the
death benefit for residents of any other country. See Alvarez Martinez, 720 P.2d at 417 (citing to
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-72 (1953)). The statute applies to citizens of all countries unless a treaty
overrides it. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-72. The court found that equal protection principles are
not violated by the statute because the equal protection clause does not reach outside of U.S. terri-
tory. Alvarez Martinez, 720 P.2d at 418; see also Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal
Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 102 (Pa. 2002) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that a Pennsylvania statute
should yield to IRCA, and that benefits for illegal aliens were not intended by the legislature).
456. Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 55.
457. Id. at 55-56.
458. Id. at 56.
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Workers' compensation benefits and services are generally provided
through privately funded insurance, paid for by employers who may then
pass the cost on to the consumers of products or services, or to their em-
ployees through adjustments in wages.459 Therefore, state action denying
workers' compensation benefits (including vocational rehabilitation) to
undocumented employees does not protect the state's economic interests.
It protects strictly private interests. In fact, denying workers' compensa-
tion coverage to undocumented workers may implicate the state's inter-
est in a negative way. Private responsibility for workers' compensation
benefits has been deemed to serve the important purpose of encouraging
employers to take steps to promote workplace safety for all workers.
Given the large numbers of undocumented immigrants in the country
who are willing to work in high-risk occupations that many legal resi-
dents find undesirable, denying this benefit effectively acts as a disincen-
tive to promote safe working conditions for everyone. In addition to that,
the unavailability of this remedy effectively reduces the cost of undocu-
mented labor, creating incentives to hire more undocumented immi-
grants, in violation of U. S. immigration policy.46°
3. A Fate Worse Than Civil Death
The situation faced by undocumented workers who are injured on
the job may find a parallel in the now largely discredited doctrine of
"civil death. ' 4 6t Civil death is a vestige of early English law.462 It origi-
nated from the practice of "outlawry," which divested convicted crimi-
nals of all civil and proprietary rights, rendering them "civilly dead.' 63
As a result of their conviction and incarceration, individuals were
deemed to stand outside of the reach of most laws, losing the right to the
most basic protections. Outlawry was a kind of moral condemnation that
was imposed upon convicted criminals in addition to the punishment
meted by the criminal courts. The practice of "outlawry" was adopted in
459. In De Ayala where speaking about a deceased worker's right to compensation, the court
stated:
One of the primary benefits that an employee works for is the satisfaction and well-
being of providing for his or her family. The law did not afford petitioner's deceased
husband different treatment while he was alive and working. He shared the same "bur-
dens" as his fellow employees. He paid taxes and contributed to the growth of his com-
pany and the general economy. His labor, along with that of his American or Canadian
co-workers, helped pay for the employer's insurance premiums required under the
worker's compensation law. Common sense dictates that he should be entitled to the
same "benefits," regardless of the residence or status of his dependents.
De Ayala, 543 So. 2d at 207.
460. See Dowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396, 404 (Conn. 1988) (stating that if employers realize
they could be relieved of the burden of providing workers' compensation coverage with an illegal
alien workforce, they would have strong incentives to hire such workers); Femandez-Lopez v. Jose
Cervino, Inc., 671 A.2d 1051, 1055-56 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (same).
461. Walter Matthews Grant et al., Special Project-The Collateral Consequences of a Crimi-
nal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 943 (1970).
462. Id. at 942-43.
463. Id. at 942.
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the United States early in its history without much deliberation. 4 4 The
practice evolved along two lines.
One line involved specific civil disabilities as a consequence for a
criminal conviction, like the loss of the right to vote, the right to hold
public office, the right to serve as a juror, and the denial of professional
or occupational licenses.465 Many of those laws continue to exist today.
The other line involved a more comprehensive loss of civil rights, or
what has come to be known as "civil death," which deprived the individ-
ual convicted of a crime of rights while he was serving a prison sen-
tence. 466 Early in the history of the U.S. the legislatures of every state
enacted some sort of civil disability statute.467 By 1970, only thirteen
states retained civil death statutes.468 By 1996, only four such statutes
remained. Three of these remaining statutes only apply to felons sen-
tenced to life in prison.469
Civil death statutes denying access to workers' compensation bene-
fits have been found unconstitutional in a variety of contexts. In Delorme
v. Pierce Freightlines Co.,470 the court held that a civil death statute sus-
pending the civil rights of people convicted of a felony violated the
Equal Protection Clause.471 In that case a person convicted of a felony
requested a hearing before the Workmen's Compensation Board to argue
472that an award for a pre-incarceration injury was inadequate. The fed-
eral district court found that the Oregon civil death statute, which sus-
pended the right of a convicted felon to litigate his legal claims, violated
the Equal Protection Clause even under rational basis analysis.473 The
court found the state's justification, which consisted of preventing point-
less or frivolous litigation, was not rationally related to the suspension of
a prisoner's right to litigate legal claims.474 Importantly, the court found
464. Id.
465. Id. at 951-52.
466. Id. at 950.
467. Id.
468. Id.
469. See Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A
National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION 10, 13-14 (1996). Impor-
tantly, even states that maintained a civil death statute sometimes found a way to separate the moral
consequences of incarceration for a crime from the real world consequences of work-related injuries.
See Garner v. Shulte Co., 259 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (holding that the humanitar-
ian purposes of the workers' compensation laws extended to the protection of dependents, granting
benefits to dependents after their father has become incarcerated and declared "civilly dead"). In
other jurisdictions, imprisonment of the claimant has not required suspension of benefits, as long as
the claimants were able to establish the wages they could have earned had they not been incarcer-
ated. See United Riggers Erectors v. Indus. Comm'n, 640 P.2d 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); King v.
McClanahan, 3 La. App. 117 (La. Ct. App. 1925); Sims v. R. D Brooks, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 139
(Mich. 1973).
470. 353 F. Supp. 258 (D. Or. 1973).
471. Delorme, 353 F. Supp. at 259-60 (referring to OR. REV. STAT. § 137.240 (1973)).
472. Id. at 259.
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that delays attendant to the suspension of a prisoner's right to litigate
legal claims often resulted in a complete denial of legitimate claims, a
result that could not be supported by the state's justifications.
475
The criminalization of labor under U. S. immigration law, the unen-
forceability of the laws, the need for low-wage workers, and the protec-
tions available to U. S. employers who rely on these workers have com-
bined to produce a class of workers who occupy not only an inferior po-
litical status but also an inferior moral status. That status denies the
workers the dignity of their labor, and in many cases, is used to deny
them the very fruit of their work. Given the unpopularity and vulnerabil-
ity of undocumented immigrants, Professor Neuman's warning that reli-
ance on the rational basis analysis of the Plyler dissent could result in
denial of protections provided even to criminals continues to have great
force.4 76 Though they make important contributions to the United States
economy and add to the public treasury, undocumented immigrants have
historically been viewed with a level of contempt reserved only for the
most morally reprehensible criminals. Fortunately, as many jurisdictions
have shown, it is possible to separate the moral blame that attaches to the
commission of a felonious crime from the very real world consequences
involved in the denial of workers' compensation. Even in cases where
individuals are convicted of violent crimes, many states have managed to
safeguard access to workers' compensation benefits in the interest of the
workers and their dependents. Importantly, many of those cases have
involved crimes far more serious than crossing a border without authori-
zation in search of a job.
Reliance on the power of the state to deny a private property interest
to this vulnerable population, its effect on the workers' health and safety
and on the well-being of even more vulnerable dependents, as well as the
potential windfall to insurers and employers resulting from that practice
should put courts on notice that a more searching review under the ra-
tional basis test is required.
VII. A NOTE ABOUT HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC. V. NLRB
The issues raised in this Article, and many more involving the ques-
tion of the extent to which workers' rights legislation protects undocu-
mented immigrants, may soon become more complicated as a result of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc.
v. NLRB.4 77 In Hoffman, the Supreme Court ruled that undocumented
workers who are illegally discharged in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) for engaging in protected concerted activity can-
475. Id.
476. See Neuman, supra note 251, at 1448.
477. 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
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not be awarded backpay. 478 Conceding that undocumented workers are
covered by the NLRA, the Court nevertheless denied backpay remedies
to the illegally discharged employees. 479 Ignoring the fact that undocu-
mented immigrants are valued in many industries, and perform essential
functions in the U.S. economy, the Court simply refused to provide a
remedy for "years of work not performed, [and] for wages that could not
lawfully have been earned .... ,480 By focusing strictly on the workers'
violation of immigration law, while ignoring the employers' violation of
labor law, Hoffman may have already contributed to the perpetuation of
this disposable workforce.
Though Hoffman may appear to be limited to the denial of backpay
remedies in the labor relations context, the decision has already created
confusion in the area of workers' compensation, and may soon influence
other areas. Relying partly on Hoffman, a Michigan court of appeals re-
cently decided to limit workers' compensation benefits for undocu-
mented workers to medical care, eliminating crucial wage-loss bene-
fits. 481 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that a per-
son's undocumented status may cause disability benefits to be sus-
pended.482 Though both cases purport to merely suspend benefits while
the workers are undocumented, the practical implications of immigration
law generally mean that the benefits are permanently denied.483
Hoffman should not cause any confusion in the area of workers'
compensation. If that case stands for anything positive, it stands for the
proposition that employers and insurance providers cannot withhold from
undocumented workers wages and other employment benefits that they
have earned. Much like earned wages, workers' compensation benefits
accrue at the time of the work-related injury. So far, lower courts have
limited Hoffman such that those benefits are not precluded by the Court's
reasoning in that case. That case should have no effect on whether un-
documented workers are eligible for workers' compensation benefits.
484
478. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 150-52.
479. Id. at 144, 151.
480. Id. at 149.
481. See Sanchez v. Eagle Alloy Inc., 658 N.W.2d 510 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (involving two
consolidated cases, in which the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that undocumented workers are
not eligible for wage-loss remedies under the Michigan workers' compensation statute, which pro-
hibits payment to individuals who have committed a crime).
482. Reinforced Earth Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 810 A.2d 99, 109 (Pa. 2002).
483. For example, immigrants who have entered the country without authorization and wish to
regularize their status must go to the U.S. Consulates in their country to file their immigration docu-
ments. Pursuant to IIRIRA, however, those who have been unlawfully present in the U.S. for six
months to a year may not return for three years, and those who have been in the U.S. for one year or
more may not return for ten years. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B) (2000). This government-enforced
separation creates a strong disincentive to file for permanent residency.
484. For a thorough analysis of Hoffman and its impact beyond labor law, see Robert L.
Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L.J. 103 (2003).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that workers' compensation benefits
and vocational rehabilitation services that do not conflict with IRCA's
prohibitions against hiring undocumented workers should be made avail-
able to those workers. Workers' compensation statutes are designed to be
construed liberally for the benefit of employees who give up their right to
seek tort remedies in exchange for the opportunity for a quick and easy
resolution to their claims. The nation's public policy is not promoted by
denying those services to undocumented workers. Undocumented immi-
grants do not live their lives in isolation, and policy decision involving
workplace rights must take into account the fact that the real social and
economic consequences are not restricted to the workers but will also
affect their families. Moreover, in the area of workers' compensation,
denial of coverage poses not only a detriment to the worker, but also a
potential windfall to employers and insurance providers. That dynamic
will act not only as an economic incentive but also as an incentive to
avoid costs of doing business by skirting workplace safety standards.485
Worker's compensation benefits cannot be treated as state funded
public benefits programs. They are private insurance commitments paid
for by employers, who can not only pass on the cost of the benefit, but
also enjoy the certainty of a reduced recovery for work-related injuries
while avoiding potentially greater liability in tort. Courts must take those
factors into account as they consider state action designed to deny this
crucial safety net. Courts must also take into account the real human con-
sequences to the workers and to their families that result from the denial
of medical treatment or vocational rehabilitation for work-related inju-
ries. Finally, courts must consider the social and economic realities pre-
sent in this shadow population's everyday lives, and the economies to
which they contribute.
485. See Mendoza v. Monmouth Recycling Corp., 672 A.2d 221, 248 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996) (concluding that denying compensation to undocumented workers may have the effect of
encouraging employers to hire undocumented workers and take less care to provide safe work-
places).

